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STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (1986) (Amended 1987) 1-2, 6 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3 (1987) 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880301-CA 
v. t 
JULIO GODINEZ, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(i) [or (iv)] (1986) (Amended 1987). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict conviction defendant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The State relies on the following statutory provision 
in this matter. 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (1986) 
(Amended 1987): 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
• • • • 
(iv) possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent 
to distribute 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in 
Schedule I or II is guilty of a 
second degree felony. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Julio Godinez, was charged with Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) 
(1986) (Amended 1987). The correct citation for that violation 
is Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) but the Information lists 
subsection (i) with the language of Possession with Intent to 
Distribute. 
Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, on March 25, 1988, 
following a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, presiding. Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Rokich on May 9, 1988, to the Utah State 
Prison for not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and 
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $10,000. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 9, 1987, Detective William McCarthy 
conducted surveillance on the Motel 6 located as Sixth South and 
200 East, Salt Lake City (T. 72-73). The detective was assigned 
to watch specifically Room 223 of the Motel as well as a suspect 
vehicle described as a Plymouth 4-door, license plate number 
821BJC (T. 75-76). Upon arrival at 3:15 p.m., the detective 
spotted the suspect vehicle parked in the motel parking lot, and 
also observed at least two individuals inside Room 223 (T. 78). 
About one hour later, two people, later identified as Mr. Julio 
Godinez and Fernando Florez, left Room 223, walked around the 
building, and proceeded to Room 225 (T. 78-80). Rooms 223 and 
225 of the Motel 6 are on the same level, same side, and are 
separated by a single room (T. 112). Mr. Godinez opened the door 
with a key and both men walked inside (T. 84). The two men 
remained in Room 225 for approximately seven minutes then left 
again, going around the building, and re-entering Room 223 (T. 
84-86). About one-half hour later, John Pender (an informant) 
and Pablo Lafarga went to Room 223 (T. 86-87). Lafarga carried a 
brown paper bag (T. 87). They were there about one minute when 
Mr. Godinez and Fernando once again left, went around the 
building, and proceeded to Room 225, but did not enter (T. 88-
89). Mr. Godinez went downstairs to the parking lot and opened 
the suspect vehicle, possibly for a key to the room, thereafter 
both men entered Room 225 (T. 89-91). 
About ten minutes later Mr. Godinez and Fernando left 
Room 225, went around the building, and entered Room 223 (T. 92). 
At this point all the individuals that Detective McCarthy had 
seen were in Room 223 (T. 92). They were there only minutes when 
Pender left (T. 92). About twenty minutes later, Mr. Godinez and 
Fernando left Room 223, went around the building, and entered 
Room 225 (T. 92). Fernando carried something in his coat which 
Detective McCarthy could readily observe from a distance of less 
than two hundred feet but he couldn't tell what it was (T. 92). 
Mr. Godinez opened the door and let Fernando in Room 225 (T. 93). 
Five or six minutes later, Mr. Godinez left Room 225, "went his 
normal route,M and returned to Room 225 approximately nine 
minutes later (T. 93). About one hour later, Lafarga exited Room 
223 only to pace on the balcony and return to Room 223 (T. 93-
94). Pender returned and went to Room 223, eventually leaving 
with LaFarga (T. 94). 
Later Mr. Godinez and Fernando left Room 225, went 
around the building and entered Room 223 (T. 95). Thereafter Mr. 
Godinez and Fernando exited Room 223 and proceeded toward the van 
of Detective Mc Carthy, a possible counter-surveillance maneuver 
(T. 95-96, 120). Fernando walked on the east side of the street, 
pacing back and forth, standing back in the bushes in the shadows 
of a wall (T. 96, 99). Mr. Godinez crossed the street to the 
west side, walked up to the surveillance van and attempted to 
look inside; at that point the detective called for a back-up (T. 
96-97, 137). Mr. Godinez then returned to Room 225, and Fernando 
returned to Room 223. 
Based on what the officers had seen they sought a 
telephonic search warrant. While waiting for the warrant, 
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Detective McCarthy and another officer entered Room 225 with a 
passkey (T. 100). Mr. Godinez was alone in the room, sitting on 
the bed (T. 100). He was patted down, but no weapons were found 
(T. 101-03). A similar entry was made into Room 223 by other 
officers (T. 103). Once the search warrant arrived, the room was 
searched (T. 105). The bed Mr. Godinez was sitting on was 
searched by the police and a plastic bag was found under the 
pillow between the mattress and the headboard; the bag contained 
approximately one pound of cocaine (T. 107-08, 182, 202). A 
bindle of a different strength cocaine was found in a cup in the 
bathroom (T. 157, 182). Mr. Godinez was relatively calm until 
the cocaine was discovered in the bed (T. 181). At the time of 
the discovery, Mr. Godinez had a look of "surprise" and "dismay," 
appearing extremely nervous, raising up and down from his chair, 
and recrossing his legs several times (T. 167-68). During this 
time Mr. Godinez "defecated himself" (T. 109). 
Mr. Godinez communicated to the police that he was a 
jewelry salesman in Salt Lake to sell jewelry (T. 151). He also 
indicated that he had been in Salt Lake three days, and was the 
sole occupant of Room 225, having had no visitors (T. 151-52). 
At the time of the arrest Mr. Godinez admitted that he had sold 
no jewelry (T. 152). 
Along with the cocaine, the police recovered a ring 
display box with rings inside, a suitcase, a briefcase containing 
miscellaneous items, personal items belonging to Mr. Godinez, 
including a wallet and items of identification, along with three 
airline passes round-trip from Los Angeles to Salt Lake via 
-*-
Tucson (T. 105, 154, 162, 164, 202). Items of luggage, a 
briefcase and other personal items were found in the room but the 
record does not specify to whom they belonged (T. 2020). The 
airplane tickets were made out to Mr. Godinez using his middle 
name (T. 153-54, 169-70). Scales were found in Room 223 (T. 
206). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on the officers' observations during surveillance 
and the statements made by defendant at his arrest, there is 
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband seized 
to support the jury's verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED AT TRIAL TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF POSSESSION 
OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
Defendant's appeal arises out of his conviction of 
Possession of Cocaine with the Intent to Distribute. Utah Code 
Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a) (1986) (Amended 1987) provides: 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally . . . (i) to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, 
a controlled or counterfeit substance; [or] 
. . . [to] (iv) possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
Under this statutory language the prosecution was 
required to prove: (1) defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed; (2) a controlled substance; and (3) he had the intent 
to distribute the same. The jury, as trier of fact, found the 
_£_ 
evidence was sufficient to establish these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Defendant's sole contention in Point I of his brief is 
that the prosecution failed to establish the element of 
possession. He claims that the State did not show that he had 
actual or even constructive possession of the controlled 
substances because of the nonexclusive use of the motel room 
where the controlled substance was found, that others did in fact 
share his room at least some of the time. 
As a general principle, to successfully challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, defendant 
must show "that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial 
that a reasonable mind must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the crime." State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 
72, 74 (Utah 1981) . 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983), specifically set forth the standard for reversing a 
conviction on insufficient evidence: 
In considering that question, we review the 
evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is so inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. 
Id. at 44 (emphasis added). With respect to the sufficiency of 
the State's evidence to establish the element of possession, the 
State concedes that defendant was not in actual physical 
possession of the controlled substance at the time it was 
discovered and seized by officers. However, the evidence in this 
case, when viewed as a whole, was sufficient to establish 
defendant's constructive possession of cocaine beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
constructive possession is sufficient to establish the element of 
possession of controlled substance. The doctrine of constructive 
possession was stated in State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709 
(Utah 1980): 
Constructive possession is generally applied 
to those circumstances where the drug is not 
found on the person of the defendant nor in 
his presence, but is found in a place under 
his dominion and control and under 
circumstances which it can be reasonably 
inferred that the defendant had actual 
knowledge of the existence of the narcotics. 
Exclusive control of the place in which the 
narcotics are found is not necessary. 
^d. at 712. 
The Court in the recent case of State v. Bingham, 732 
P.2d 132 (Utah 1987), upheld a conviction for possession of 
marijuana with the intent to distribute for value under the 
constructive possession theory stating: 
Constructive possession is proved by 
establishing a connection between the accused 
and the drug sufficient to permit an 
inference that the accused had both the 
ability and the intent to exercise dominion 
or control over it. 
I^d. at 133, citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
The State clearly established defendant's dominion and 
control over Room 225 at Motel 6, where the cocaine was 
discovered. The defendant indicated to the police at the time of 
his arrest that he was the sole occupant of Room 225 at Motel 6, 
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having had no visitors (T. 151, 152). Though it was established 
that others had visited the room for short periods of time on the 
night of the arrest, the surveillance officer testified that each 
time Room 225 was entered, it was made accessible by defendant 
with his key (T. 89-91, 93). Further, it was established that 
most of the items seized in Room 225 at the time of the arrest 
were attributable to defendant, including his personal 
possessions, a ring box, and three airline tickets (T. 105, 154, 
164). Finally, defendant was the only individual present in Room 
225 at the time of the arrest and was sitting on the bed where 
the drug was discovered (T. 101). 
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), the Court 
indicated that "whether a sufficient nexus between the accused 
and the drug exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case." Ld. at 319, citing State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 
1264 (Utah 1983). As indicated by the appellant, the Court in 
Fox held that: 
ownership and/or occupancy of the premises 
upon which the drugs are found, although 
important factors, are not alone sufficient 
to establish constructive possession, 
especially when occupancy is not exclusive. 
Id., citing United States v. Davis# 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). But the Court in Fox went on to say that other factors 
-might combine to show a nexus between the accused and the drug." 
Id. These factors include "incriminating behavior of the 
accused," .Id., citing United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th 
Cir. 1981): "presence of drugs in a specific area over which the 
accused had control . . . " Id., citing Walker v. United States, 
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489 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974) and "presence of drug paraphernalia 
among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the 
accused has special control." Jd., citing United States v. 
James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The State 
submitted sufficient evidence that the jury could have found that 
the defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine. 
The bahavior of the defendant was incriminating. 
Defendant went back and forth between Rooms 225 and 223 a number 
of times on the night of the arrest. Each time the defendant 
changed rooms, he chose to walk around the building before 
entering the other room (T. 80, 84, 88-89, 92-93, 95), even 
though Rooms 225 and 223 were on the same level, same side and 
separated by only a single room (T. 112). Further, defendant and 
Fernando exited the Motel in a possible counter-surveillance 
maneuver (T. 95-96, 260). Defendant approached and attempted to 
look inside the surveillance van, while Fernando took a position 
across the street in the shadows near a wall and in some bushes 
(T. 96-97, 99, 137). Moreover, defendant acted relaxed up until 
the time the drugs were discovered (T. 181). At that time his 
behavior changed dramatically as defendant became extremely 
nervous, moving up and down from his chair and crossing his legs 
back and forth (T. 167-68). Defendant finally "defecated 
himself" (T. 109). Finally, the airline tickets seized at the 
time of the arrest were somewhat suspiciously made out to the 
defendant using his middle name (T. 153-54, 169-70). There was 
no clear explanation as to why the defendant had done so, 
although it was testified that other identification seized by the 
officers was in the defendant's first name (T. 153, 162). Other 
incriminating behavior includes the defendant's association with 
the individuals in Room 225 and his entrance into the suspect 
vehicle (T. 88-89). 
There was the presence of drugs in a specific area over 
which the defendant had control. As indicated earlier, the 
defendant explained that he was the sole occupant of Room 225; 
access by other individuals was made possible by the defendant 
with his key. Further, the one pound block of cocaine was found 
on the very bed on which the defendant was sitting when the 
officers entered Room 225 at the time of the arrest (T. 101, 107-
08). 
Finally, there was the presence of drug paraphernalia 
among a place where the defendant had special control. The 
cocaine found in Room 225 was approximately in a one half kilo 
(one pound) block. It is logical that prior to any type of sale 
the block would be weighed to determine its exact weight. A 
scale capable of measuring minute amounts of any substance and 
which can be used for weighing drugs was discovered in Room 223. 
Though it is clear that the defendant did not have exclusive 
control or occupancy of Room 223, he did in fact enter that room 
on a number of occasions during the night of the arrest, his 
access thereto was presumably never denied. Therefore, the State 
maintains that such access to Room 223 allowed the defendant to 
have special control over the items therein, including the 
scales. 
Defendant in his brief has given other explanations for 
his actions. Though other explanations are possible, they are 
not logical in light of the immense circumstancial evidence 
indicating the defendant had constructive possession of the 
cocaine. Nonetheless, these other explanations need not be 
accepted by this Court, for this Court under the standard set 
forth in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), must review 
"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." 
Id. at 444. The jury obviously did not accept defendant's 
explanation of his activities that evening. There is nothing 
inherently improbable in the version of the facts accepted by the 
jury which could cause this Court to reverse defendant's 
conviction. The evidence in this case was sufficient to sustain 
defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction. i 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The so-called "test" referred to as "reasonable and necessary"1 is jabberwocky.2 It 
certainly sounds like a legal test, but nobody will admit confusion or ignorance.3 State 
Farm's unauthorized imposition of the undefined and standardless "test" which results in 
retroactive denial and prospective suspension of PIP benefits has killed the legislature's 
intent that injured motorists should be able to recover the reasonable value of all their 
out-of-pocket expenses within 30 days of providing reasonable proof.4 
1
 As explained in Plaintiffs' opening Brief at n. 5, State Farm's combination of 
"reasonable [value]" with "necessary" and its assertion that this improper combination of 
defined and undefined words is a "test" is, standing alone, bad faith and fraud. While 
Plaintiffs believed that there was utility in using "reasonable and necessary" in their 
opening Brief, it is no longer a useful fiction. The question presented to the Court is the 
interpretation and implementation of the word "necessary." 
2
 "'It seems very pretty,' she said when she had finished it, 'but it's rather hard to 
understand!' (You see she didn't like to confess even to herself, that she couldn't make it 
out at all.) 'Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas — only I don't exactly know 
what they are! However, somebody killed something: that's clear, at any rate — '" 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, ch. 1, 1872 (Alice's critique of the poem 
Jabberwocky (as opposed to the adjective "jabberwocky" used herein)). 
3
 Neither judges nor lawyers are capable of understanding or applying the "test;" 
rather State Farm relies wholly on insurance doctors. Certainly, the stock phrases and 
"magic words" beloved by State Farm carry no talismanic assurance of comprehension by 
injured motorists untrained in the law. See Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y. 771 P.2d 
1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989). 
4
 "Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be denied benefits 
unless a provision in the statutory contract between the [insured motorist], the state, 
and the [PIP carrier] explicitly suspends the benefits." King v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 
P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act) (citation omitted). 
The foregoing statement of law is even more suited to PIP contracts for several reasons: 
(1) PIP medical benefits are limited to $3,000; (2) PIP contracts are first-party contracts 
for which the insured has personally paid the premium, whereas injured employees are 
third-party claimants; and (3) The current statutory language of the no-fault statute 
affords no delay. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FOREIGN STATES' CONCLUSIONS ARE NEITHER 
RELEVANT NOR PERSUASIVE. 
State Farm relies heavily (almost exclusively) on the bare conclusions asserted by 
various appellate courts from various foreign jurisdictions. It does not make the slightest 
effort to analyze those states' no-fault statutes5 or to compare them to Utah's no-fault 
statute. See State Farm's Brief at pp. 15-17. State Farm's reliance is misplaced. 
Note that the no-fault systems in this country are wholly statutory 
systems. It is incumbent upon any practitioner to ascertain the exact 
language of the statute in effect at the pertinent time, as the statute is 
the primary source of both rights under the plan, and the procedures 
to be followed in obtaining those rights. 
It is generally agreed that victims of traffic mishaps should receive 
compensation for their out-of-pocket medical expenses and loss of 
earnings as such expenses accrue, in lieu of having to first pursue a 
claim in tort through to settlement or final judgment. Indeed, the 
purposes pronounced for no-fault plans are generally in close 
agreement; it is the manner in which to achieve these goals on 
which there are a variety of opinions, leading to some significant 
differences in the specifics of the plans that have been adopted. 
The statutory schemes . . . change rapidly and with some frequency. 
Any specific details of a given state's statute should thus be 
viewed as illustrative of a viewpoint on no-fault, rather than a 
guarantee that a specific jurisdiction follows such a plan. The 
practitioner must always evaluate the statute as it existed on the 
relevant date in the relevant jurisdiction. 
Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:1 and Couch on Insurance 3d. §125:5 (emphasis added). 
5
 For example, some states amended their no-fault statutes to include "medical 
management" and some (e.g., Connecticut and Georgia) have abandoned the tort 
threshold. In addition, State Farm appended two rulings denying class certification in PIP 
cases perhaps misleadingly implying nationwide unanimity. But see Exhibit D. 
2 
The only justification given by State Farm for its practices is that the "potential for 
fraud[6]... is virtually unlimited." See State Farm's Brief at p. 16. Plaintiffs have never 
argued that State Farm cannot protect itself against fraud. Plaintiffs have never argued 
that State Farm cannot protect itself against bad faith. Plaintiffs have never argued that 
State Farm cannot investigate7 claims. Plaintiffs only argue that State Farm cannot 
substitute the opinions of insurance doctors for the decisions of treating physicians. PIP 
coverage insures against loss.8 "Medical" disagreements are wholly irrelevant. 
II. THE RISK TRANSFERRED IS "ALL EXPENSES," THE 
INSURED'S OBLIGATION IS "PROOF OF THE FACT AND 
AMOUNT OF EXPENSES INCURRED" AND "NECESSARY" 
MUST BE INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE. 
The no-fault statute's insuring clause both defines and limits coverage. The term 
"involving"9 in the primary portion of Section 308 (for the named insured and relatives) 
6
 Plaintiffs agree that the potential for fraud is great, Plaintiffs alleged that PIP-
related fraud is disproportionately committed by PIP carriers, and Plaintiffs have properly 
alleged that State Farm committed fraud in its handling of the Class's claims. 
7
 To the contrary, Plaintiffs complain that State Farm did not investigate or fairly 
evaluate their claims. For example, Mrs. Tucker's "pre-existing condition" was the 
pretextual justification for denying her claim. If State Farm had investigated the claim, 
perhaps it would have learned that "pre-existing condition" is not a valid basis for denial 
of PIP benefits. See Couch on Insurance 3d, §171:49 at p. 171-66. And State Farm's 
insurance doctor's argument regarding Mr. Tucker's x-ray is some sort of "intervening 
cause" or "superseding negligence" argument which relies on "foreseeability" which is an 
element of "proximate causation" which has nothing to do with the no-fault statute. 
8
 See, £&, Wilde v. Mid-Centurv Ins. Co.. 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981) 
(explaining that proof of loss for PIP household services benefits requires that the insured 
"simply . . . show[ that the insured] was disabled...."). 
9
 The primary focus of the no-fault statute is "prompt and efficient" 
reimbursement of injured insureds' out-of-pocket expenses without proof of "causation." 
3 
and the term "arising out o f in the omnibus provision are not to be construed to extend 
coverage to an injured person unless the accident "involves" a motor vehicle.10 UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-22-308. 
Similarly, if Plaintiffs were to translate State Farm's bald assertions into legal 
terminology, Subsection 307(1 )(a) is an extension-type clause which defines the scope of 
coverage, but State Farm asserts that the word "necessary"11 contained in the clause could 
arguably imply some degree of limitation, and, certainly, the defined term "reasonable 
value" serves as a limitation on the scope of PIP coverage.12 If the word "necessary" were 
a coverage term, it is true that "necessary" could be defined (in isolation) as requiring a 
medical treatment to be absolutely unavoidable (i.e., that the insured would suffer at least 
The phraseology employed by the legislature in the insuring clause was "involving" 
together with its narrower cousin "arising out of," and the no-fault statute never mentions 
their much narrower relation "caused by" (except in the tort threshold clause) even 
though State Farm's "reasonable and necessary" defense is essentially a 
"proximate causation" or "legal liability" argument in purported reliance upon the risk 
clause (a.k.a. the coverage clause). See, e.g.. Meadow Valley Contractors v. 
Transcontinental Ins. Co.. 2001 UT App 190 at fflf 12-15, 423 Utah Adv. Rep. 29. 
10
 In other words, the insuring clause answers the question: Who? State Farm 
does not dispute that Plaintiffs are insureds under Section 308. 
11
 If it were a "coverage term," the meaning of the word "necessary" would have 
to have been made more clear by, for example, appending a prepositional phrase such as: 
"necessary in the opinion of "just like the legislature did when it appended a 
prepositional phrase to "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred." 
12
 Indemnification for all out-of-pocket expenses within 30 days is limited by a 
term which limits the coverage itself: "reasonable value." "Reasonable value" is, 
therefore, a "coverage term." Specifically, an insured faces a rebuttable presumption that 
he or she is not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of medical treatment (or other 
covered items) which exceed the price controls imposed under Section 307's RVS. 
4 
death if he or she did not receive certain medical treatment). The word "necessary" could 
also be defined as requiring a medical treatment to be merely convenient or subjectively 
helpful. Because both interpretations are tenable, the word is ambiguous. "[A]ny 
ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an insurance policy must be resolved in favor 
of coverage." LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Also, 
because the policy is an adhesion contract, any ambiguity must be construed against the 
insurer. See id, It necessarily follows that State Farm's insistence that the ambiguity of a 
single word gives it "wide latitude" to deny PIP claims and discontinue PIP benefits is 
preposterous. See State Farm's Brief at p. 16. 
III. THE WORD "NECESSARY" IS A COLLATERAL 
REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR CONDITION 
CONTAINED IN THE COVERAGE (i.e., RISK) CLAUSE. 
Sometimes legalese is much easier to understand than plain language.13 The word 
"necessary" is contained in a clause which extends coverage to the insured. In other 
words, it is contained in the clause which defines the amount of the risk which is to be 
13
 For example, State Farm insists on calling its doctor's conclusion relying on 
"reasonable and necessary" a "statutory predicate." State Farm refuses to explain what, if 
anything, "reasonable and necessary" means, and its "clarifying" term "statutory 
predicate" is absolutely unintelligible. Plaintiffs are, therefore, forced to fully argue State 
Farm's mere assertions so that the flaws inherent in its analysis can be laid bare. See 
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Or.. 2000 UT 90, f 19, 15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is 
obliged to assess the black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to 
act accordingly. This obligation to properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions 
a party and its counsel make in litigation."); see also S&G. Inc. v. Intermountain Power 
Agency. 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) ("S&G's argument does not withstand scrutiny. The 
change order could not have created a condition precedent to a claim that had accrued ten 
months earlier."); Hertz v. Nordic Ltd. Inc.. 761 P.2d 959, 963 (Utah App. 1988) (stating 
"no one can avail himself of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has 
himself occasioned its non-performance"). 
5 
transferred to the PIP carrier through the contractual relationship (hereinafter the 
"coverage clause" or "scope of coverage"). 
More precisely, the word "necessary" is either: (a) a coverage term which limits the 
risk transferred by the policy, or (b) a collateral representation, warranty or condition. See 
Couch on Insurance 3d, §101:6. If the word "necessary" were a coverage term, the 
analysis of its use would involve identifying the additional burden which could be placed 
upon the insured and the resulting process's effect on the insured's substantive right of 
indemnification; whereas, if the word "necessary" is a collateral representation, condition 
or warranty, it relates to a subjective representation14 made by the insured which, if 
breached (by the insured's fraud or bad faith), would give rise to a PIP carrier's right to 
attempt to void the underlying insurance contract. 
The word "necessary," unlike the defined term "reasonable value," is a collateral 
representation, warranty or condition which does not limit the coverage15 available to an 
insured. Rather, it serves as the insured's promise of good faith in connection with 
medical treatment decisions. 
The Court may not permit State Farm to confuse the "coverage" requirement and 
the proof of loss requirement. Certainly, expenses which are "covered" must be 
14
 See, e.g.. Couch on Insurance 3d, §81:40 (explaining that a subjective 
representation is a promise which is based upon intention or opinion and is not 
susceptible of present knowledge; thus, good faith is the only criterion of truth). 
15
 If "necessary" were intended as a coverage term resulting in a limitation on the 
amount recoverable, it would have been defined by the legislature; otherwise the word 
invites litigation and inefficiency. 
6 
"necessary" in some sense,16 but that begs the question of the nature of the procedural 
proof of loss requirement. 
In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction 
between a 'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right 
may be established or enforced. This fundamental distinction 
between the loss, in fact, being within coverage, and the manner by 
which the insured goes about establishing this to the insurer's 
satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency . . . . 
Couch on Insurance 3d, §193:19 (emphasis added). 
The insured has the substantive right of indemnification for "all expenses" which 
are incurred for "necessary" medical treatment. The proof of loss requirement, which 
must be substantially complied with17 by the insured, exists as a mechanism to establish 
entitlement to the substantive contractual right. 
Substantial performance of the insured's obligation does not entail a jury trial, it 
does not entail changing the opinion of State Farm's agent and advocate (i.e., the 
insurance doctor), and it does not transform the injured motorist into an insurer of his or 
her doctor's practice of medicine in conformity with the post hoc assertions of the 
16
 The Court will consider "each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the 
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v. 
Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981). 
17
 See Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994) ("Professor 
Corbin states this rule as follows: 'When a contract has been made for an agreed 
exchange of two performances, one of which is to be rendered first, the rendition of this 
one substantially in full is a constructive condition precedent to the duty of the other party 
to render his [or her] part of the exchange.' 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 
§700, at 309 (I960)."). 
7 
insurance doctor.18 To the contrary, this Court and the legislature have consistently 
explained that the no-fault statute was intended to eliminate litigation for the minimal 
losses to be paid by the PIP carrier. It is impossible to reconcile the plain statutory 
language, this Court's gloss thereon, and the legislature's expressed intent of "no 
litigation," on one hand, and State Farm's desire for case-by-case litigation, on the other 
hand. 
Instead of mandating jury trials for determining the scope of coverage, the proof of 
loss requirement is set forth in Section 309(5)(b) and requires that the insured provide 
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" (i.e., this answers the 
question: How?). After an insured complies with this proof of loss requirement (i.e., the 
procedure), he or she is then entitled to receive the substantive right19 of payment of "all 
expenses" guaranteed under the contract (i.e., this answers the question: What?), and the 
insurer's reciprocal performance of its contractual duties is required within 30 days (i.e., 
this answers the question: When?). The insurer's only defenses are set forth in Section 
309 (i.e., this answers the question: Unless?). 
State Farm, properly, only requires the proof of loss procedure set forth in Section 
309(5) for initial expenses such as ambulance charges, emergency room charges, and 
18
 It is not negligence to rely upon the advice of a treating physician. Mikkelsen v. 
Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah 1988). Moreover, contributory negligence is not a 
permissible affirmative defense in a contract action. 
19
 At the risk of being repetitious, the substantive right is the PIP carrier's payment 
of all out-of-pocket expenses (i.e., the risk transferred). 
8 
initial treatments.20 However, whenever State Farm determines that the expenses incurred 
by its insureds exceed some arbitrary and undisclosed level,21 it solicits the second opinion 
of an insurance doctor. 
The use of an insurance doctor is not part of the proof of loss requirement. Rather, 
it is State Farm's unilateral and after-the-fact analysis of the insured's out-of-pocket 
expenses under standards extrinsic to the no-fault statute. State Farm's denial of PIP 
benefits based upon its insurance doctor's disagreement with the medical decisions of the 
treating physicians and its insurance doctor's interpretation of the PIP carrier's legal 
obligations22 is an "exclusionary" act. 
State Farm agrees that it may not impose an exclusion in the form of "reasonable 
and necessary,"23 but denies that its actions are, in fact, exclusionary actions. State Farm 
does not argue that the Plaintiffs failed to do or provide anything. State Farm does not 
20
 This fact gives rise to estoppel issues which are explicit in the allegations set 
forth in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at If 52. When an insurer pays prior similar 
claims which reasonably induce insureds to assume that such future damages are to be 
reimbursed as PIP benefits and subjected to the same proof, a court may rely upon 
equitable estoppel principles to prevent the insurer from denying or discontinuing 
payments. This point alone requires reversal of the district court's order of dismissal. 
21
 See MERCY guidelines used by State Farm's West Valley automobile claims 
processing center which are attached to Plaintiffs' opening Brief as Exhibit I. 
22
 See State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App.), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693 
(Utah 1996) ("[T]hose portions of the expert witnesses' testimony to which [plaintiff] 
objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because the witnesses tie their opinions to the 
requirements of Utah law. Thus, [plaintiff] has established error and that this error should 
have been obvious to the court."). 
23
 See State Farm's Brief at p. 13. 
9 
assert that Plaintiffs did something wrong after the claim arose and the risk attached. 
Instead, State Farm asserts that its unilateral decision to request an insurance doctor's 
second opinion permitted it to rest on nothing more substantial than the inarticulate legal 
opinions of its insurance doctor and, thereby, to limit its contractual liability. See United 
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) (explaining that a 
clause operates as an exclusion if it purports to reduce an insurer's contractual liability). 
In order for State Farm to be permitted to deny or discontinue payment of PIP 
benefits based upon the second opinion of its insurance doctors, State Farm must be 
endowed with such a right pursuant to a clear and explicit "exclusion, condition or 
limitation" in addition to the seven which the legislature has provided in Section 309 (and 
which the legislature limited by using the word "only"). It should be obvious that the 
word "necessary" contained in the coverage clause cannot be decontextualized and 
exported into an exclusionary clause in the absence of legislative action. Nevertheless, 
that is exactly what State Farm acknowledges that it does. 
Because the physician's treatment decisions are not attributable to the insured,24 if 
the treating physician committed fraud or, according to the insurance doctor, made some 
other "mistake" (in the absence of proof— not speculative fear — of collusion25), such 
24
 See Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co.. 963 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1998) 
(explaining that "'[i]t would be 'patently unfair' to allow the insurer to avoid its 
obligations under the policy on the basis of information that the applicant did not know, 
or alternatively, did not fully understand.'") (citations omitted). 
25
 State Farm, "by this argument suggests that protecting an insurer from possible . 
. . collusion outweighs the legislative mandate to provide mandatory protection for 
victims of automobile accidents. We do not agree." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call 
10 
fraud or mistake cannot constitute the insured's violation of his or her subjective 
representation that medical treatments would be "necessary." Therefore, the only 
justification for an insurer's denial of PIP benefits or delay of payment beyond 30 days is a 
PIP carrier's allegation and proof26 that the insured violated his or her representation by 
obtaining medical treatment in bad faith. A second opinion expressed by an insurance 
doctor does not have any tendency to show that the insured violated his or her 
representation of good faith. On the other hand, a PIP carrier's reliance upon the legal 
opinion of an insurance doctor is conclusive proof that the insurer did not investigate, 
analyze or act rationally. 
The acknowledgment that "necessary" is not a coverage term (but rather, that it is a 
collateral representation, warranty or condition) gives effect to the word and harmonizes 
each and every element of the no-fault statute. It is consistent with the ambiguity 
principle. It advances the legislative intent that PIP benefits provide prompt and efficient 
reimbursement for minimal losses. It does not render the 30-day payment provision 
meaningless. It does not render the "proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" 
language meaningless. It acknowledges the professed fears of insurers that they may be 
subjected to "fraud" or "bad faith" and does not eliminate those valid defenses. It does not 
render the no-fault statute's promise of coverage illusory. And it does not permit State 
712 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah 1985). 
26
 An insurer who wishes to debate "fairly debatable" arguments is required to 
debate them "in court" or lose its affirmative defense. It is not proper to misrepresent the 
terms of the contract, issue naked rejections of coverage, employ intimidating claims 
practices, and still profess entitlement to a "fair debate." 
11 
Farm to receive an unconscionable windfall of $42.5 million dollars per year (even though 
State Farm has beat the odds27 and collected its windfall for approximately 12 years 
because its victims have, by and large, been too poor and ignorant to fight back). 
IV. LITIGATION IS PROVIDED FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
— NOT AS A FORMAL APPRAISAL MECHANISM. 
Subsection 309(5)(d) provides a remedy against PIP carriers for breach of contract. 
State Farm insists that this clause supports its view that its insurance doctor's purported 
"medical" disagreements were intended to be resolved through protracted litigation on a 
case-by-case basis. If State Farm's assertion were true, litigation would be the "appraisal" 
mechanism28 chosen by the legislature. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the no-fault statute was 
intended to provide an insurance process which would be implemented efficiently and 
"without litigation."29 Litigation and penalties are only provided to remedy "breach" in 
27
 See Exhibit E: accord Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991V 
28
 First, State Farm's assertion would be contradicted by the well-settled 
legislative intent and this Court's precedent. Second, State Farm's assertion would render 
the 30-day payment provision and the proof of loss provision meaningless. Third, the 
criteria underlying State Farm's "test" are so subjective that the "test" is meaningless and 
it cannot be litigated. Fourth, State Farm's assertion would contradict its own assertions 
relating to the statute of limitations in violation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
Apparently, State Farm believes that a first round of litigation regarding "necessary" 
medical treatments would be required to determine the scope of coverage "on a case-by-
case basis." The first round of coverage litigation would be followed by a second round 
of litigation (subject to a 3-year statute of limitations which would begin running at the 
end of the first litigation) regarding whether State Farm breached its contract. 
29
 State Farm relies on Pennington v. Allstate to contradict prior precedent which 
discouraged litigation in connection with PIP claims. But see Carrier v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration, 909 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah App. 1995) (expressing unwillingness to read case 
12 
connection with the requirement that expenses incurred30 "shall" be paid within 30 days. 
The arbitrary "reasonable and necessary" defense (and its concomitant threat of 
protracted and expensive litigation) which is advocated by State Farm (in derogation of 
statutory law) has great in terrorem value for State Farm. The wrongheaded resort to 
litigation for any dispute (whether well-founded or not) provides an opportunity for State 
Farm and other overreaching insurers to impose costly burdens on their defenseless, 
gullible, and easily-intimidated insureds. State Farm does not possess its preferred 
remedy.31 In sum, State Farm's last-resort argument that the Court should figuratively and 
to overrule another sub silentio because "the two situations are so different"). 
30
 By way of additional example, the use of threats of protracted litigation to 
defeat contractual obligations in the context of liquidated damages has been rejected. See 
Reliance Ins. v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Utah 1993) ("The liquidated 
damages provision itself states that the $600 per day will be assessed when 'any work 
shall remain.' . . . The contract between the parties . . . considers final completion as 
determined by the UDOT engineer. There is no ambiguity about this point.. . . The only 
requirement is that the engineer act in good faith in making this final determination... 
. No evidence exists to suggest that the UDOT engineer acted otherwise. 
. . . Reliance's argument.. . would defeat the fundamental purpose of liquidated 
damages.... These types of provisions are justifiable on the ground that they promote 
economic efficiency.. . . Reliance's argument calls for a determination of whether the 
project was indeed substantially completed and, if so, how substantial the completion 
was. Such determinations only foster additional and wasteful litigation.... liquidated 
damages provisions are intended to be alternative resolutions to disputes. . . . liquidated 
damages provisions, aside from being compensatory, are valid and consistent with public 
policy as an appropriate means of inducing timely performance.... It would 
frustrate this policy to allow disputes over substantial performance to render 
liquidated damages provisions unenforceable....") (citations omitted) (bold added). 
31
 The concept of "remedies" is a critical consideration. State Farm claims that the 
"remedy" which it "should" possess when it disagrees with an insured's treating 
physician is retroactive denial and suspension of future benefits. The "remedy" which it 
actually possess, on the other hand, is to report the doctor to the insurance commissioner 
or to attempt to prove that the treating physician or its insured committed fraud against it. 
13 
literally throw up its hands and declare the parties' dispute to be "a question for the jury" 
(on a "case-by-case," ad infinitum, ad nauseam, basis) is without merit. 
V. STATE FARM'S VERSION OF THE NO-FAULT STATUTE 
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, § 11 BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE 
AN EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE REMEDY. 
Plaintiffs, theoretically,32 can recover their "uncovered" special damages from the 
tortfeasor33 pursuant to State Farm's "not reasonable and necessary" epithet. A person 
who carries PIP coverage is immune from suit for the special damages covered by the no-
fault statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197, 
1200 (Utah 1980). Therefore, it must follow that the insured tortfeasor is not immune 
from suit for special damages which are not covered by PIP coverage. See, e.g.. State 
Farm's Brief at p. 28; ROBERT KEETON & ALAN I. WlDlSS, INSURANCE LAW, § 4.10 at p. 
419 (2d ed. 1988). The insured tortfeasor's liability in tort for special damages which are 
not covered by PIP coverage is not subject to Section 309's no-fault threshold which 
provides partial tort immunity (and abrogates causes of action) for "general damages." 
If State Farm's mere assertions regarding PIP coverage were rational, Plaintiffs 
would sue the tortfeasor, Mrs. Tucker (i.e., Farmers) for the "uncovered" special 
32
 In addition to the Court's concern for unfairness to insureds (debt and health 
problems), it must also be sensitive to the "unacceptable consequences" of State Farm's 
preferred construction of the statute. Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 1374 (Utah 
App.), cert denied. 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in the result). The 
Court must also interpret the statute in a reasonable way, with an eye toward the 
construction that will achieve the best results in practical application. See Tanner v. 
Phoenix Ins. Co.. 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah App. 1990). 
33
 Plaintiffs explained the impracticality of suing State Farm under its "R&N" 
theory in their opening Brief at pp. 47-48. 
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damages.34 Of course, Farmers would assert that the special damages were covered and 
that Mrs. Tucker is entitled to immunity. Their burden to show immunity would consist of 
showing that Mrs. Tucker carried PIP coverage. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall 
1999 UT 33, TflO? 978 P.2d 460 ("tort-feasors who maintain no-fault insurance on their 
vehicles are not personally liable for PIP benefits and are immune from suit . . . .") . 
The burden would then shift to Plaintiffs to prove that their special damages were 
not covered under their PIP coverage. This could not consist of simply repeating State 
Farm's mere assertion of non-coverage;35 rather Plaintiffs could not overcome no-fault 
immunity for covered special damages unless and until they proved that State Farm's mere 
assertions were actually correct. In other words, under State Farm's asserted "test," 
Plaintiffs would have to prove that the expenses and treatments were "not reasonable and 
necessary" even though they have no idea how that would be proved.36 
34
 Plaintiffs will seek recovery from Mrs. Tucker for their "uncovered" special 
damages if the Court rules that State Farm's mere assertions are proper. 
35
 Plaintiffs could simply cite and analogize UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-305(2)(c) 
which provides that a third-party tortfeasor is an "uninsured motorist" for purposes of an 
injured motorist's access to first-party, fault-based UM coverage simply by showing that 
third-party's liability carrier refused to provide coverage for 60 days. However, this 
argument would be frivolous because the definition of a term or the existence of a 
procedural safeguard set forth in one type of contract does not make it ipso facto 
appropriate in another type of contract. See also State Farm's expropriation of 
"reasonable and necessary" and "medical management" from HMO-type health insurance 
contracts. 
36
 "When state action impinges on fundamental rights, strict compliance with due 
process must be observed. A statute which affects fundamental liberties is 
unconstitutional if it is so vague that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning '" In re Bover. 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); accord 
Skaggs Drug Centers. Inc. v. Ashlev. 484 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1971) (applying 
15 
Therefore, instead of suing State Farm for breach of contract, Plaintiffs are entitled 
to rely on their fiduciary's37 assertions and make it an involuntary co-plaintiff pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19. Plaintiffs' ability to recover special damages in tort from the third-
party tortfeasor would depend on their privy's lack of contractual obligations. 
Next, if Plaintiffs proved that their expenses were "not reasonable and necessary" 
and therefore not covered by State Farm's PIP coverage, they could attempt to prove Mrs. 
Tucker's negligence and the proximate causation of injury and resulting special damages. 
Of course, part of their case would involve laying foundation to admit evidence of the "the 
fact and amount" of damages (which means they would have to show that the treatments 
and expenses "were reasonable and necessary"). In addition, because State Farm's 
arguments (i.e., Plaintiffs' arguments in this example) are effectively indistinguishable 
from "proximate causation," an additional insurmountable hurdle would arise. After the 
confused jury "guesses" that the self-contradicting Plaintiffs should not recover their 
special damages, Plaintiffs would be left without any remedy. 
vagueness doctrine to a civil matter). Perhaps it could be argued that Plaintiffs, their 
treating doctors, and their counsel all suffer from a chronic case of small-brain syndrome 
rendering them "not of common intelligence." However, it is no answer to say that the 
meaning of the no-fault statute is to be "guessed at" by a jury or by an insurance doctor. 
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1) which exists "to ensure that the entire 
insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine from 
the policy exactly what coverage he or she has." CuUum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1993). 
37
 State Farm's refusal to pay PIP benefits subjects insureds to personal liability 
for the "uncovered," but incurred, expenses. State Farm's misconduct is analogous to a 
liability carrier's action resulting in a verdict against its insured in excess of the coverage 
limit where the liability carrier had the opportunity to settle within the coverage limit. 
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VI. STATE FARM'S ASSERTION THAT IT CAN DO ANYTHING 
WHICH IS NOT EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN IS ABSURD. 
State Farm asserts that the legislature should have expressly forbidden its "medical 
management" practices if it did not want State Farm to deny PIP benefits. See State 
Farm's Brief at p. 12. It asserts that the "legislature's silence implies that it did not intend 
to preclude^8] insurers from" denying PIP benefits based upon an insurance doctor's 
second opinion. Id. The Court may not infer a right of delay, suspension, or retroactive 
denial where the statute affords no delay and expressly requires payment within 30 days.39 
Moreover, permitted exclusionary actions are explicitly limited to seven types. 
In 1974, the concept of "medical management" consisting of an insurer's use of 
broad guidelines40 and insurance doctors for the unintended, undisclosed and unauthorized 
purpose of delaying or denying insurance benefits was not known to or readily accepted by 
anybody. In the late 1980s, the business of "medical management" was born. Under 
medical management, the phrase "reasonable and necessary" was redefined to supplant the 
opinion of the treating physician with decision-making by "gate-keepers" whose 
38
 State Farm ignores the fact that the bizarre results of its assertions are "in 
blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). State Farm made one 
effort to reconcile its assertions regarding "necessary" and Section 309's 30-day payment 
provision. State Farm noted that Section 309 references the damages provided by Section 
307; therefore, it reasoned, the 30-day payment provision does not preclude its actions. 
See Transcript at p. 50. This argument is circular, it would render the 30-day payment 
provision meaningless, and it would make the statute's penalty provisions toothless. 
39
 "Expressio, unius est exclusio alterius. " See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 882 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1994). 
40
 See Exhibit I appended to Plaintiffs' opening Brief. 
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subjective conclusions are cloaked in the language of "medical necessity." 
The recent debate over the "Patients' Bill of Rights" which purports to create better 
standards and procedural safeguards for the "medical management" practices of HMOs is 
vigorously opposed because, HMOs claim, reposing decision-making in the treating 
physician or a panel of truly independent physicians will "destroy medical management." 
"Destruction" of "managed care," they assert, will revert health insurance to the 
"fee-for-service" regime which existed prior to the invention of "medical management." 
The "fee-for-service" insurance detested and supplanted by HMOs is the only type of 
health insurance which existed in 1974. 
In other words, the Utah Legislature's foresight cannot be presumed to so great that 
it adopted the then-uninvented "medical management" regimie when it adopted the no-fault 
statute. The legislature has learned of "medical management" and adopted it in the 
Workers' Compensation Act and other statutes. Many states besides Utah have adopted 
"medical management" practices in their no-fault statutes (many of which are "true" 
no-fault statutes). However, the Utah legislature NEVER amended41 the 1974 no-fault 
statute to include the "medical management" practices invented in the 1980s. 
Simply stated, the no-fault statute does not say what State Farm says it says, but 
State Farm, nevertheless, comes before this Court essentially asking: "Are you going to 
41
 State Farm's nationwide adoption of "medical management" in connection with 
its Medical Cost Containment Pogrom did not amend the no-fault statute. The power to 
amend statutes is a constitutional power that has not been delegated to State Farm, and 
State Farm may not usurp legislative powers for the purpose of unilaterally changing the 
ground rules underlying the no-fault statute. This seems too obvious to admit of serious 
controversy. 
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believe me, or your lying eyes?"42 The legislature is to set the rules; neither the regulated 
parties nor the courts are to change43 them — especially after the outcome of an accident is 
known (i.e., after expenses have been "incurred"). 
VII. STATE FARM DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY DENY FULL 
PAYMENT OF THE PIP BENEFITS TO WHICH PLAINTIFFS 
WERE ENTITLED UNTIL SEPTEMBER 18, 1997. 
On or about November 6, 1996, State Farm notified Plaintiffs that although its 
insurance doctor assured44 it that it owed no duty to provide additional PIP benefits to 
Plaintiffs, it was willing to change its decision if its insurance doctor changed his 
decision.45 See Exhibit A: State Farm's Brief at p. 21. State Farm invited Plaintiffs to 
42
 This quote is attributed to Groucho Marx. The idea expressed above fits nicely 
with the legal relativism observed by many courts that "there are two sides to every 
argument." The unstated subtext of this sacred cow is: "Because the two sides are equally 
valid, it does not matter which side the court chooses to endorse." 
43
 State Farm's undaunted repetition of a "catch phrase" does not render the actual 
language of the statute meaningless or irrelevant. If State Farm perceives too many 
personal injury lawsuits, perhaps the $3,000 coverage limit and tort threshold is too low 
under current economic conditions (including medical inflation) and should be raised. If 
State Farm perceives a real need for imposing "medical management" on Utah's 
motorists it would be well-within its rights to use its economic might to hire lobbyists 
(rather than insurance doctors and defense attorneys). State Farm cannot unilaterally alter 
a statutory scheme with which it disagrees, and courts cannot abdicate their duty to 
interpret and enforce the no-fault statute as it is written just because State Farm finds that 
the requirements interfere with its desire to reap undeserved windfalls. 
44
 The unauthorized use of "medical management" is the breach of the 
constructive promise that neither party would intentionally do anything to impair the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract (i.e., bad faith). See St. Benedict's 
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991). 
45
 "If Dr. Marble does advise us differently than what he has in his report of 
October 22, 1996, then we will advise you of that." Exhibit A. 
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provide additional evidence (of some undisclosed nature) that might convince its insurance 
doctor and, thereby, enable it to provide additional PIP benefits. 
Now State Farm asserts46 that the statute of limitations was running during the 
period in which it was showing its "good faith"47 desire to comply with its statutory and 
contractual duties (or to allow Plaintiffs to comply with the "statutory predicate"). In 
other words: "gotcha!"48 This duplicity is not the least bit clever,49 it is unbecoming of a 
46
 State Farm asserts that "There is no factual record to support" the existence of 
the parties' agreement to negotiate. See State Farm's Brief at p. 21. But see Exhibit A. 
The need for facts to support its assertions is exactly why its Rule 12(b)(6) statute of 
limitations motion based on its affirmative defense was improper. 
In addition, State Farm asserts that Plaintiffs "provided no support for the 
proposition that a party is precluded from raising an affirmative defense in a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. Id at p. 26. This is an example of the annoyingly common "lawyer 
trick" of distraction which State Farm employs repeatedly in its opposition Brief. See 
State Farm's Brief at pp. 11, 25, 26, 27. Rather than attempting to distinguish the caselaw 
relied upon by Plaintiffs, State Farm tries to convince the Court that Plaintiffs didn't cite 
any caselaw. Plaintiffs, in fact, presented three cases from Utah's appellate courts which 
clearly and unequivocally explain that State Farm's affirmative defense was not properly 
raised and that Plaintiffs' timely Motion to Strike should have been granted. See 
Plaintiffs' opening Brief at pp. 36-37. 
47
 State Farm may not rely on the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Sittner v. 
Schriever. 2001 UT App 99, ffl[ 15-17, 418 Utah Adv. Rep. 15. 
48
 But see Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d 22 at 27-28, 456 P.2d 159 
(1969) (holding that estoppel was a question of fact where claims adjustor lulled 
third-party claimant into understanding that claim was being resolved). 
49
 See, e ^ , Gassman v. Dorius 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) (Ellet, J. dissenting) 
("Thus the arrested [allegedly drunk] person, even while asserting that he is sober, refuses 
to take the test which would prove his claim and, instead, imposes upon the time of a 
busy officer for hours by claiming that he will take a test which he never does. . . . It 
seems to me that it takes a naive court to fall for that type of shyster trick. It must be a 
court more interested in protecting the driving privilege of drunks than in the preservation 
of life and limb upon the highways of this state. In addition to this, the courts should 
follow the law as it is written. There is no provision in the law for any delay."). 
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fiduciary administering a statutory contract,50 and it should not have been rewarded by the 
district court (on its own motion, argument and "discovery," and without review of the 
actual correspondence or any other competent evidence at an oral argument regarding an 
improperly interposed Rule 12(b)(6) motion).51 
A definite denial was required before State Farm is considered to have made a full 
anticipatory breach, rather than a partial anticipatory breach. See Plaintiffs' opening Brief 
at p. 42. A definite rejection of a claim occurs when: 
the insured is definitely advised that the insurer has disapproved the 
insured's claim, and recognizes no right on the insured's part to have 
his or her claim reconsidered 
Couch on Insurance 3d, §236:93 (emphasis added); see also id. at §236:96. State Farm did 
recognize a right on the insureds' part to have their claim reconsidered by the insurance 
doctor. Therefore, there was no definite denial and the claim did not begin to run until 
50
 See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Or.. 2000 UT 90,119, 15 P.3d 1030. 
51
 State Farm did not prove the applicability of any statute of limitations; instead it 
simply asserted that it began running on the date of the automobile accident. State Farm 
ignored the express tolling mechanism, and forced the district court to argue its 
affirmative defense and to perform "fact finding" regarding the irrelevant first receipt by 
Plaintiffs of an ambiguous notice of denial. See Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, ^ f 14, 
1 P.3d 558 ("A defendant's burden includes showing that the statute of limitation 
alleged as an affirmative defense actually applies. See Ponderosa One Ltd. v. Salt 
Lake City Suburban Sanitary Dist.t 738 P.2d 635, 636-37 (Utah 1987) (reversing 
summary judgment when statute of limitations alleged as affirmative defense was 
not proven).") (emphasis added); see also id. at ^ 17 ("we will not consider other 
statutes of limitation that might bear on [plaintiffs'] claim. See also Wasatch Mines Co. 
v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 75 n.5, 465 P.2d 1007, 1011 n.5 (1970) (to be considered, 
the applicable statute of limitation "must be specifically pleaded"); American Theatre 
Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 306, 80 P.2d 922, 923 (1938) (stating "if the [statute of 
limitation] pleaded is not applicable it does not avail defendant that the action may be 
barred by another section not pleaded" or proved).") (emphasis added). 
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September 18, 1997.52 See Amended Complaint at Tf 16 attached hereto as Exhibit B. And 
even if the statute of limitations began to run before a definite rejection of the claim, the 
express terms of the statute provide that the limitations period was tolled until the parties 
ended their voluntary discussions relating to the insurance doctor's opinions (i.e., 
September 18, 1997). See Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). Moreover, 
even if the statute applied to one of Plaintiffs' claims, State Farm's misrepresentation of 
the terms of the contract53 was fraudulent concealment which prevents application of the 
statute of limitations. See Snow v. Rudd. 2000 UT 20, 998 P.2d 262. 
VIII. PLAINTIFFS' CAUSES OF ACTION, BESIDES BREACH OF 
CONTRACT, ARE GOVERNED BY A FOUR-YEAR STATUTE. 
State Farm asserts that because the relationship between the parties was based on a 
first-party contract, all of the causes of action should fall under Section 313 and its three-
year limitations period. See State Farm's brief at pp. 22-24. Not surprisingly, there is no 
legal authority54 for State Farm's absurd assertion. 
52
 State Farm relies (at p. 26) upon Moore's for the proposition that its Rule 
12(b)(6) motion was proper because the statute of limitations issue was clear from the 
face of the Amended Complaint. The face of the complaint referenced September 18, 
1997 as the date of the breach; therefore, the rule purportedly supporting State Farm's 
argument actually belies its assertion. 
53
 The analysis involves when a person should know of his or her legal injury, not 
just the fact of non-payment. According to the district court, Plaintiffs suffered no legal 
injury; therefore, this Court can hardly impute more knowledge to Plaintiffs. 
54
 State Farm cites a case that says that form should not be elevated over 
substance, but State Farm's purported substance consists of saying "it is clear." State 
Farm's Brief at p. 22. A proper examination (rather than a bald assertion) reveals that the 
causes of action are independent torts. See, e ^ , Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 
P.2d 527, 535-36 (Utah 1993) (explaining that a statement in Beck that torts can arise 
22 
Even if the district court's argument and conclusion that the statute of limitations 
began to run on November 6, 1996 were correct,55 the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of 
fiduciary duty, bad faith, and injunctive and declaratory relief causes of action are all 
subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs alleged not only breaches of the 
express contractual provisions, but also misleading statements, misrepresentations, 
profiting by a fiduciary at the expense of the beneficiary, and wrongful imposition of debt 
and legal liability. These facts give rise to torts arising from duties of reasonable care 
which arose out of law rather than the contract.56 And even if the bad faith cause of action 
from a contractual relationship "stands . . . for the proposition that the same facts giving 
rise to a breach of contract may also give rise to an independent tort claim, such as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, or misrepresentation."); see also Nelson 
v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 573 (Utah 1996) (explaining that when one voluntarily 
undertakes to render services for the protection of another, the actor also voluntarily 
accepts a duty of reasonable care toward that person regardless of whether a duty of care 
existed before the aid was given); DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah 
1983) (addressing ex delicto duties and ex contractu duties); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 323, 324 (1965). Moreover, the injuries suffered were physical, not merely 
financial. See Sullivan v. Barnett 139 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 1998); Exhibit B at % 6, p. 30. 
55
 If the district court were correct, Plaintiffs are still proper representatives of the 
proposed Class. If Plaintiffs were not proper class representatives, Plaintiffs would still 
be entitled to seek substitution of new class representatives. 
The doctrine of mootness arises from considerations relating to a party's legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome. However, there are various exceptions to the 
traditional rules which relate to injunctive relief and class actions. Plaintiffs do not 
simply seek money damages; they also seek declaratory and injunctive relief including a 
cessation of State Farm's unlawful practices. See Exhibit B. Specifically, this is a case 
that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" and there is a "reasonable expectation 
that the controversy will recur in the future." See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (3rd ed.) 
at §§2.12-2.14 (and cases cited therein). Therefore, Plaintiffs are proper class 
representatives even if their personal claims were moot. Id 
56
 State Farm "misunderstands the source of its duty . . . it is a duty imposed by the 
common law of the state." Retherford v. AT & T Comm.. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). 
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sounded in contract (as "first-party bad faith"), the cause of action would still not be based 
"on the . . . contract of first-party insurance" subjecting the cause of action to a three-year 
statute of limitations; rather it "arises from"57 the contractual relationship and is governed 
by the four-year, catch-all statute of limitations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3). In 
other words, the cause of action is based upon an implied/constructive obligation rather 
than the bare terms of the contract, and the Amended Complaint was filed September 12, 
2000 (i.e., less than four years after November 6, 1996). 
IX. STATE FARM BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES GIVING 
RISE TO A "THIRD-PARTY" BAD FAITH CLAIM. 
State Farm insists that because PIP coverage is "first-party insurance," it 
necessarily gives rise to first-party bad faith. See State Farm's Brief at pp. 18-19. State 
Farm ignores the fact that its self-interested coverage decisions imposed liability on its 
insureds.58 State Farm should be obligated to either defend its decisions or pay the PIP 
benefits owed to its insureds. See, e.g.. Exhibit C (Bear River's acknowledgment of its 
duty to defend its coverage decisions which expose its insureds to liability). 
While no-fault coverages are, in fact, first-party benefits payable to 
the injured party by his or her own insurance company, this insurance 
clearly is intended to replace or augment automobile liability 
insurance.... 
Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:2. Therefore, State Farm's mere assertion that PIP benefits 
(like the duty to defend) are generally in the nature of first-party coverage fails to shed any 
57
 "Under both Beck and Ammerman, the duty of an insurer to deal fairly is 
derived from the insurance contract" not "based on" it. Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 536. 
58
 Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs on a monthly basis. 
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light on the question of whether its bad faith in connection with refusing to pay PIP 
benefits gives rise to third-party bad faith. PIP benefits are part of the broad statutory 
scheme to protect injured motorists. Indicia of agency are present in the PIP relationship, 
the PIP carrier is entrusted to pay PIP medical benefits directly to the provider, a PIP 
carrier's refusal to provide PIP benefits subjects the insured to personal liability for 
"uncovered," but incurred, medical bills (typically augmented by collection costs and 
attorney fees), and PIP carriers are not in an adversarial position with respect to their 
insureds. Because the no-fault statute is not a typical first-party coverage like the UM 
coverage analyzed in Beck, it cannot be subjected to a superficial analysis consisting of 
only a single similarity. State Farm owes fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs, and its breach 
affects the insureds' economic and physical health. Therefore, its bad faith is third-party 
bad faith. State Farm has actively concealed its fraudulent behavior and continues to 
attempt to justify its widespread fraud and breach of fiduciary duty which is an additional 
and continuing violation of its duty of good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's order should be reversed. State Farm may not raise any 
defenses which are extrinsic to the no-fault statute. This case does not raise individualized 
medical issues, rather it raises contractual issues and accompanying tortious misconduct. 
DATED this day of August, 2001. 
CARR & WAJDDQ^PS 
5rneys for Plaintiffs / Appellants 
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Exhibit A 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
September 18, 1997 West Valley Service Center 
2655 South Lake Erie Drive 
P. 0 . Box 30463 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130 
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 9 5 6 - 4 0 0 0 
Trent Waddoups 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 201, Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Our Insured/Your Client: Deevoy and Marian Tucker 
Claim: 44 966 378 
Date of Loss: August 5, 1994 
Dear Mr. Waddoups: 
Please be advised that we have received your letter dated 
August 28, 1997, regarding your concerns. 
Again, as stated in my letter to you on August 22, we would be 
happy to review any further medical documentation and medical 
bills that you have that are still outstanding for the 
independent medical examiners review. Therefore, please forward 
that information to us in order to have the independent medical 
examiner review and advise us if this still would be related to 
the auto accident of August 5, 1994. 
Please be advised that without that information, i.e., 
documentation and medical bills, we cannot consider and review 
further medical bills under our insured's automobile policy. 
Therefore, if you wish for State Farm Insurance to review your 
client's outstanding medical bills, please forward those bills to 
us along with the medical documentation showing how its again 
related to the auto accident of August 5, 1994. At which time we 
would have the independent medical examiner's review and advise 
us how that would be related. 
Sincerely, 
Julio Sandoval 
Claim Specialist 
Phone: (801) 956-4020 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
GUESS/jm 025/0918004 
HOME OFFICES: BLOnMlKinTfUi TMTKinTQ A i 7 i n . n n m 
Trent Waddoups 
Page 2 
September 18, 1997 
cc: Deevoy and Marian Tucker 
3290 West Hanover Park Drive 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
A u g u s t 2 2 , 1 9 9 7 West Valley Service Center 
2655 South Lake Erie Drive 
P. 0. Box 30463 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130 
Telephone: (801)956-4000 
Trent Waddoups 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 2 01, Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Our Insureds/Your Clients: Deevoy and Marian Tucker 
Claim: 44 966 378 
Date of Loss: August 5, 1994 
Dear Mr. Waddoups: 
I am writing you regarding your letter of August 15, 1997. 
Please be advised that we do have the right to schedule an 
independent medical exam per our insured's contract or auto 
policy. Enclosed is a copy of the auto policy of page 5 
indicating under the caption heading, Other Duties Under the 
No-Fault Law, Uninsured Motor Vehicle and Underinsured Motor 
Vehicle and Death Dismemberment and Loss of Sight Coverages. 
Your will note that it states in Section B, the person making a 
claim also shall be examined by physicians paid by us as often as 
we reasonably may require. A copy of the report will be sent to 
the person upon written requests. Therefore, as you stated in 
your letter of August 17, that we do not have the right to 
schedule an independent medical examination, please refer again 
to our insured's contract or auto policy under the no-fault PIP 
payments. 
If you wish for State Farm to consider any further payment under 
our insured's automobile policy, please provide medical 
documentation showing how the bills that were incurred for the 
date of accident of August 5, 1994, are accident related. Please 
also refer the medical bills for those dates of services that 
were not considered for payment, at which time I will refer the 
medical information showing how the bills in question that were 
not considered for payment, to the independent medical examiner 
for his review. Once I receive the independent medical 
examiner's report advising us whether these medical bills that 
STATE FARM 
HOME OFFICES: BL00MINGT0N, ILLINOIS 61710-0001 
Trent Waddoups 
Page 2 
August 22, 1997 
are outstanding are related to the auto accident of August 5, 
1994, or not, I will advise you at that time. 
Sincerely, 
Julio Sandoval 
Claim Specialist 
Phone: (801) 956-4020 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
JS/tr 021/0822022 
cc: Marian and Deevoy Tucker 
3290 West Handover Park Drive 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
November 6, 1996 West Valley Service Center 
2655 South Lake Erie Drive 
P. 0 . Box 30463 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130 
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 9 5 6 - 4 0 0 0 
DEE VOY TUCKER AND MARY ANN TUCKER 
3290 WEST HANOVER PARK DRIVE 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UT 84119 
Re: Our Insureds: Dee Voy and Mary Ann Tucker 
Claim: 44 966 378 
Date of Loss: August 5, 1994 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Tucker: 
I am writing you regarding the above captioned accident in which 
you were involved. Enclosed you will find a copy of the 
independent medical examiners report for your review. 
In your review^of the independent medical examiners report, you 
will find that Dr. Stephen Marble has indicated that Mr. Tucker's 
injuries are directly related to the automobile accident, and had 
reached maximum therapeutic benefit on June 1996. He also states 
that no further chiropractic or physical therapy treatment would 
be necessary. Dr. Marble also states that the x-rays taken by 
Dr. Howard were not considered to be necessary, since FHP had 
taken x-rays previously. There are also other items that were 
not considered to be reasonable or necessary for the treatments 
that were charged or given by Dr. Douglas Howard. Therefore, we 
will be paying for what has considered to be reasonable and 
necessary under your automobile policy. 
The independent medical examiners report, which was done by 
Stephen Marble, on Mrs. Tucker, states that her injuries related 
to the automobile accident were concluded on January 1995. It is 
Dr. Marble's opinion that the chiropractic care provided by 
Dr. Howard in 1996, is unrelated to the motor vehicle accident in 
question. Rather, the chiropractic care is related solely to the 
patient's pre-existing condition of lumbar scoliosis. Therefore, 
you would have to refer these medical bills to your other health 
carrier for their review and consideration. We can only pay for 
medical bills that are directly related to the injury caused by 
the automobile accident under your automobile policy. Enclosed 
are those medical bills for your disbursement. 
If there are any other questions regarding this matter, please 
feel free to contact me. My number here is 956-4020. If there 
should be any other medical documentation that was not given to 
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the independent medical examiner, Dr. Marble, please forward that 
information to us in order to have him review. If Dr. Marble 
does advise us differently than what he has in his report of 
October 22, 1996, then we will advise you of that. 
Sincerely, 
Julio Sandoval 
Claim Specialist 
Phone: (801) 956-4020 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
JS/alw 18/1106006 
cc: Delta Health 
Douglas Howard, D.C. 
837 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT. STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
DEE VOY TUCKER and MARIAN : 
TUCKER, Individually and On Behalf of ; 
Themselves and All Others Similarly ] 
Situated, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ' 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ; 
INSURANCE COMPANY, STEPHEN P. ' 
MARBLE, M.D., MA YE HELEN 
POTTER, and FARMERS INSURANCE : 
EXCHANGE,, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) A M E N D E D 
J COMPLAINT 
) Civil No. 9 8 0 9 0 7 3 6 9 
i Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), Plaintiffs amend their Complaint and hereby 
complain of Defendants and for causes of action allege: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiffs were, at all times relevant hereto, residents of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and both the automobile collision and the contract of insurance at issue herein 
were entered into in said county and state. 
2. At all times material hereto, Defendant STATE FARM and Defendant Farmers 
Insurance Exchange were and are insurance companies transacting the business of 
automobile insurance in the State of Utah and both defendants solicit the services of 
so-called "medical management" and "utilization review" with respect to the adjustment 
of claims made under contracts written to comply with the no-fault statute. 
3. At all times material hereto, Defendant Stephen P. Marble, M.D. was and is an 
individual transacting the business of an insurance medical examiner ("IME") for PIP 
claims and represented himself as a so-called "independent medical examiner" in the 
State of Utah. 
4. At all times material hereto, Defendant Maye Helen Potter was and is an 
individual residing in the State of Utah. 
5. The amount at issue is within the Court's jurisdictional limits. 
6. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs paid an insurance premium to Defendant 
STATE FARM in return for which Defendant STATE FARM became obligated to 
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provide, among other things, personal injury protection ("PIP") conforming to the 
requirements of the Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act as set forth at UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 & 309 (the "no-fault statute"). 
7. On or about August 5, 1994, Plaintiffs were injured in an accident involving the 
vehicle owned by Plaintiffs and insured by Defendant STATE FARM. 
8. As a result of their injuries, Plaintiffs' doctors prescribed tests and treatment for 
said injuries; thus Plaintiffs incurred medical expenses. 
9. Plaintiffs' injuries prevented them from engaging in normal professional and 
domestic work duties. 
10. Reasonable proof of Plaintiffs' medical expenses was provided to Defendant 
STATE FARM through Plaintiffs' treating physicians and medical providers and legal 
counsel. 
11. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307 and the aforementioned policy of 
insurance, Defendant STATE FARM is and was required to pay, among other things: (1) 
Medical expenses benefits for the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, 
x-ray, and rehabilitation services up to the limit defined in the aforementioned policy of 
insurance; (2) Household services benefits of up to $20.00 per day for a maximum of 365 
days for household services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for the 
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provision of household services that, but for the injury, Plaintiffs would have performed 
for the household; and (3) Lost wages benefits of the lesser of $250.00 per week or 85% 
of any loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity from inability to work for a 
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks {hereinafter referred to generally, and 
interchangeably, as "PIP benefits"). 
12. Pursuant to said policy and Utah law, Plaintiffs were only required to provide 
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred and reasonable proof of 
disability. 
13. The reasonable proof standard only required Plaintiffs to provide reasonable 
proof tending to show that Plaintiffs' injuries and damages arose out of an accident 
involving a covered vehicle. 
14. Pursuant to said policy and Utah law, Defendant STATE FARM agreed to put 
Plaintiffs' interests ahead of its own interests (a fiduciary relationship) to the extent of its 
coverage obligation, to provide Plaintiffs with indemnification against liability, and to 
pay to Plaintiffs or on their behalf all statutorily-required PIP benefits within 30 days of 
receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss, damage, liability, or expense 
incurred. 
15. Plaintiffs' treating doctors provided reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
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Plaintiffs' injuries and proof that Plaintiffs' injuries had arisen out of the August 4, 1994 
accident and the prescription that Plaintiffs not engage in normal work activities (i.e., 
physical disability). 
16. On or about September 18, 1997, State Farm notified Plaintiffs' legal counsel 
that it refused to pay the PIP benefits due to Plaintiffs on the basis of Defendant Marble's 
interpretation of Plaintiffs' insurance policy. 
17. In lieu of providing the required PIP benefits to Plaintiffs when due, 
Defendant STATE FARM demanded that Plaintiffs be examined by a doctor hired by 
Defendant STATE FARM and that their PIP benefits be conditioned upon his opinion of 
what was "reasonable and necessary." {hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant 
STATE FARM'S "'IME' doctor") 
18. Defendant STATE FARM mischaracterized its "IME" doctor's physical 
examination of Plaintiffs as a so-called "Independent Medical Examination." 
19. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME doctor was contractually obligated to assist 
Defendant STATE FARM to increase its profits through its claims adjustment techniques. 
20. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor did not owe any physician-patient, 
ethical, contractual, or medical obligations to Plaintiffs. 
21. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor contended in a report dated 
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October 22, 1996 that Plaintiff Marian Tucker's injuries arose out of unidentified and 
undocumented accidents which he speculated were not associated with the ownership, use 
or maintenance of Plaintiffs' insured vehicle or, alternatively, that Plaintiffs injuries 
arose out of a pre-existing condition. 
22. Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor contended in a report dated 
October 22, 1996 that Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker's injuries arose out of the accident, but he 
speculated that certain expenses were not "reasonable and necessary" subsequent to an 
arbitrary maximum medical improvement cut-off date and that certain x-rays were not 
"necessary." 
23. Based upon its "IME" doctor's medical/legal opinions, Defendant STATE 
FARM paid only the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' medical expenses that Defendant 
Marble arbitrarily and subjectively deemed "related to" and "necessary" (contractual 
terms interpreted by Dr. Marble). 
24. Defendant STATE FARM failed and refused to indemnify Plaintiffs and hold 
them harmless or to otherwise provide PIP benefits to the extent of its liability coverage 
limits therefor. 
25. Defendant STATE FARM represented to Plaintiffs that they were obligated to 
provide proof of causation and necessity to a degree and of a sort which is not 
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contemplated by the no-fault statute, the insurance policy prepared by Defendant STATE 
FARM, insurance contracts in general, indemnity contracts in general, or even Utah tort 
law. 
26. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay was allegedly founded upon the 
fact that Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor (one of Defendant STATE FARM'S 
many "IME" doctors hired for the purpose of denying valid claims — and paid exorbitant 
sums to do so) did not fully agree with Plaintiffs' treating physicians. 
27. Neither the no-fault statute nor Defendant STATE FARM'S insurance policy 
provides a coverage limitation, coverage exclusion, or any other type or variety of 
coverage condition which might permit Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to provide 
coverage or otherwise limit Defendant STATE FARM'S obligation to provide PIP 
benefits to Plaintiffs on the basis of its "IME" doctor's interpretation of State Farm's legal 
obligations under its contract and his professed disagreement with the healing methods 
chosen Plaintiffs' treating physicians. 
28. Farmers Insurance Exchange was the third-party insurance carrier for the 
negligent party, Maye Helen Potter. 
29. Pursuant to Section 309(6) of the no-fault statute, Farmers has the ultimate 
responsibility (under negligence principles) to pay the PIP benefits to which Plaintiffs 
were entitled from their insurance carrier, State Farm. 
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30. Farmers and State Farm are both signatories to the inter-company arbitration 
agreement for PIP reimbursement (erroneously referred to by both defendants as 
"subrogation") which vests jurisdiction over disputes in Arbitration Forums, Inc. 
31. Farmers, as a common practice, refuses provide reimbursement to PIP carriers 
who provide PIP benefits to innocent insureds based upon its assertions that (1) the PIP 
carrier paid benefits that were not "reasonable and necessary" or some similar trite and 
misleading pseudo-legal phraseology, and (2) that its liability coverage limit also limits 
its separate and distinct obligation to reimburse the insurer of the non-negligent party. 
32. Farmers's reckless, illicit and continuing scheme to avoid its duty of PIP 
reimbursement encouraged State Farm to refuse to pay Plaintiffs the amount it owed 
under its contract because the desired perceptions propounded by Farmers hardened with 
every episode propounded in the unsupervised arbitration forum that fit the legal myth. 
F I R S T CAUSE O F A C T I O N 
Against Defendant Maye Helen Potter 
(Negligence) 
33. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
34. On or about August 4, 1994 at or about 3500 South 3600 West, West Valley 
City, Utah, Defendant, Maye Helen Potter operated her vehicle in a negligent and careless 
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manner causing it to collide with the vehicle operated by Plaintiff Marian Tucker and 
Plaintiff Dee Voy Tucker. 
35. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid, 
Plaintiffs have incurred severe, permanent, enfeebling, and disabling injuries which have 
caused and will cause pain, suffering, and severe emotional distress all to their respective 
general damage in amounts to be determined at trial. 
36. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid, 
Plaintiffs will be unable to pursue their normal activities, avocations, and employment all 
to their respective general damage in amounts to be determined at trial. 
37. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid, 
Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker has incurred past medical expenses in the sum $5,104.71 and 
Plaintiff Marian Tucker has incurred past medical expenses in the sum $5,380.00 and 
both Plaintiffs will incur future medical expenses in amounts to be determined at trial. 
38. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid, 
Plaintiffs have incurred past income loss and will incur future income loss due to their 
permanent disabilities and/or permanent impairments in amounts to be determined at trial. 
39. As a direct and proximate result of said Defendant's misconduct as aforesaid, 
Plaintiffs' vehicle was damaged, and Plaintiffs were deprived of its use during its repair 
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in amounts to be determined at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment against Defendant Potter as follows: 
A. General damages in amounts to be determined at trial; 
B. Past and future medical expenses in amounts to be determined at 
trial; 
C. Past and future loss of income in amounts to be determined at trial; 
D. Property damage and loss of use in amounts to be determined at trial; 
and 
E. Prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, costs of court and such 
other and further relief as the Court deems just in the premises. 
C L A S S A L L E G A T I O N S 
Against Defendant State Fa rm 
{Declaratory Relief; Breach of Contract, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty; and Fraud) 
40. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
41. This claim is brought on behalf of a class (the "Class") consisting of all 
persons (i) who were insured under (or who were beneficiaries of) any insurance policy 
issued by State Farm (or any of its subsidiaries and affiliates) and in effect at any time 
prior to the filing of this action, and/or policies presently in effect, containing no-fault or 
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PIP coverage purporting to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 & 
309; (ii) who submitted claims for PIP benefits; (iii) whose claims were denied (in whole 
or in part) or delayed (except to the extent permitted by Section 309 of the no-fault 
statute); and (iv) on the ground that the claims were not "reasonable and necessary," that 
the claims were subject to and/or disputed by "medical management" techniques 
including, but not limited to, so-called "independent medical examinations" and 
"utilization reviews," or that the claims were subject to exclusions, limitations, or 
conditions (no matter what State Farm's nomenclature was) other than the seven set forth 
in Section 309 of the no-fault statute. 
42. Plaintiffs seek certification under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), or alternatively or 
additionally, under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
43. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. During 
the past twelve to fifteen years since "medical management" was invented for the purpose 
of HMO insurance contracts (not inconsequentially, this late-1980s invention and key tool 
of HMO contracts has never been subsequently adopted by the Legislature as a 
component of the 1973 no-fault statute), State Farm undoubtedly entered into more than 
the 20-30 automobile insurance contracts necessary to satisfy the numerosity requirement. 
Although the precise number of Class members can only be ascertained through 
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appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe that there are hundreds or thousands of members 
in the proposed Class. 
44. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, which questions 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. The principal 
issue is whether the no-fault statute permits unlawful and self-interested claims 
adjustment techniques as alleged herein. 
45. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of those of the Class members, in that they 
are based on the same legal and factual theories and predominant common questions. 
46. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 
Although their personal claims are not large enough to warrant individual litigation, they 
have enough at stake to ensure that they will vigorously litigate this matter. Plaintiffs 
wish to obtain redress of the wrong. To that end, Plaintiffs have retained counsel 
experienced in complex litigation and specifically claims under the Utah Financial 
Responsibility Act (including the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act). 
47. Certification is appropriate under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), in that State Farm 
has imposed uniform policies with respect to the entire Class, and injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the imposition of the policies is necessary under the state law 
claims. The monetary relief sought, including statutory damages, does not detract from 
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the cohesiveness of the Class. 
48. Alternatively and in addition, Plaintiffs request certification under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The common questions predominate over any individual issues. A class 
action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this dispute. Because State 
Farm is misstating its actual obligations, most insureds will not realize that they have a 
claim. Moreover, most attorneys will not realize that their clients have a claim because of 
the Utah State Bar's ethical opinion which prohibits charging a client for assisting with 
recovery of PIP benefits and because State Farm's erroneous assertions concerning its 
obligations developed in a forum where there is little or no oversight by attorneys or the 
courts (leading many to believe that State Farm's misconduct is the status quo). A class 
action is, therefore, essential to prevent a failure of justice. Furthermore, the size of the 
claims involved does not warrant individual litigation of the magnitude and complexity 
necessary to challenge the legality of the denials of claims. 
S E C O N D C A U S E O F A C T I O N 
Against Defendant State Farm 
{Declaratory Judgment ana Injunction) 
49. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
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50. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. 
51. Pursuant to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-33-2, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that neither the no-fault statute nor 
Defendant State Farm's insurance contract provides any basis for State Farm's denials of 
PIP benefits based upon medical management or any similar sharp practice. 
52. Defendant STATE FARM did not rely upon any clause in its insurance 
contract when it denied coverage and is estopped from doing so now. Moreover, a clause 
which might support State Farm's misconduct would be void under the no-fault statute. 
53. If Defendant STATE FARM were permitted to deny coverage based upon the 
failure of Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange to concede its reimbursement 
obligation and/or Defendant Marble's lack of unanimous agreement with the Plaintiffs' 
treating physicians, the personal injury protection coverage under the insurance contract 
would be illusory and against public policy because benefil payments which were 
intended by the Legislature as an immediate and timely substitute remedy for the 
abrogation of citizens' constitutionally protected right to bring a negligence action would, 
instead, be a split cause of action and solely a matter of the whims of the Defendants. 
54. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs were entitled to 
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payment of PIP benefits within 30 days of presenting their medical bills. The overarching 
goal of the no-fault statute is immediate compensation for all expenses for which 
reasonable proof is presented to the PIP carrier. No exclusion or condition increases 
Plaintiffs' obligations, permits "medical management," or otherwise shifts the risk of loss 
from State Farm back to Plaintiffs under the clear and unambiguous terms of the no-fault 
statute. 
55. Defendant STATE FARM'S asserted basis for denying Plaintiffs' claim is that 
it was reviewed and denied by the "independent" Defendant Marble who was chosen and 
paid for without Plaintiffs' input and only upon the unilateral decision of Defendant 
STATE FARM. 
56. Defendant STATE FARM should be preliminarily and permanently enjoined 
from denying PIP benefits based upon any reason not specifically set forth in the no-fault 
statute and from referring to its agents who owe it significant economic duties as 
"impartial," "independent" or any other similarly misleading terms. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
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THIRD C A U S E OF ACTION 
Against Defendant State Farm 
{Breach of Insurance Contract) 
57. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
58. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. 
59. Defendant STATE FARM'S failure and refusal to pay PIP benefits to or on 
behalf of Plaintiffs constitutes breach of contract. 
60. Defendant STATE FARM'S late payment of those PIP benefits which it did 
provide to or on behalf of Plaintiffs constitutes breach of contract. 
61. A PIP coverage endorsement is a contract for indemnity against liability and, 
thus, Defendant STATE FARM'S duty to pay begins at the time liability is incurred, and 
Defendant STATE FARM's misrepresentation to the contrary constitutes breach of 
contract. 
62. Defendant STATE FARM's partial payment instead of saving Plaintiffs 
harmless from all legal liability actually incurred up to Defendant STATE FARM's 
S3,000 liability coverage limits constitutes breach of contract. 
63. Defendant STATE FARM's act of conditioning the payment of PIP benefits 
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upon its "IME" doctor's agreement with Plaintiffs' treating physicians constitutes breach 
of contract. 
64. Defendant STATE FARM'S misrepresentation that PIP benefits were not 
payable because Plaintiffs' injuries were exacerbated by "a pre-existing condition" 
constitutes breach of contract. 
65. Defendant STATE FARM'S imposition of evidentiary burdens and measures 
of proof upon Plaintiffs with respect to each and every treatment, bill or partial 
application for benefits when Plaintiffs are, in fact, only obligated to provide reasonable 
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred which is neither authorized by the 
no-fault statute nor clearly and unequivocally set forth in Defendant STATE FARM'S 
insurance policy constitutes breach of contract. 
66. Defendant STATE FARM'S misrepresentation that Plaintiffs was obligated to 
subject himself to a physical examination by Defendant STATE FARM'S "IME" doctor 
prior to, as a condition of indemnification and payment of PIP benefits, or as a necessary 
prerequisite to determining its obligation to Plaintiffs constitutes breach of contract. 
67. Defendant STATE FARM'S use of its "IME" doctors to engage in the 
adjustment of claims and unauthorized practice of law constitutes breach of contract. 
68. Defendant STATE FARM owed Plaintiffs duties of loyalty, among other 
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fiduciary duties, and its decision to put its interests before Plaintiffs' interests constitutes 
breach of contract. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
F O U R T H CAUSE O F A C T I O N 
Agfainst Defendant State Farm 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) 
69. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
70. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. 
71. Defendant STATE FARM was contractually obligated to act for the benefit of 
and on behalf of Plaintiffs. 
72. Defendant STATE FARM knows or should know that PIP benefits are 
intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a 
result of an accident without having to bring a lawsuit. 
73. The no-fault statute and Utah's public policy provides that Plaintiffs reposes 
trust in Defendant STATE FARM to pay all medical bills he incurred up to the coverage 
limits he purchased. 
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74. Defendant STATE FARM owed a duty to pay third-party claims (i.e., money 
owed to medical providers for services rendered) and to defend the insured against 
third-party claims against the insured thus creating a situation where the insurer controls 
the outcome or settlement of PIP benefits, and the insured gives up any right to direct the 
negotiations. The insured is fully dependent upon the insurer to see that, in dealing with 
claims by third parties, the insured's best interests are protected. This situation, among 
other considerations, establishes a confidential relationship and imposes upon the insurer 
a fiduciary duty, which means that the insurer must act for the benefit of the insured. The 
fiduciary duty requires the insurer to act in good faith and give at least as much 
consideration to protecting the interests of its insured as it would in protecting its own 
interests. 
75. Defendant STATE FARM was obligated to use its ingenuity, influence, and 
energy, and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the 
health, property and earning power of its insureds, even if the interests of Defendant 
STATE FARM were in conflict with its insureds' personal interests. 
76. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP benefits did not 
adhere to the ordinary standards of professional competence. 
77. Defendant STATE FARM'S employment of its "IME" doctors and its reliance 
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upon the opinions purchased therefrom in order to justify denial of claims where its 
insured suffered actual damages was self-interested. 
78. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP benefits was self-
interested. 
79. Defendant STATE FARM'S consideration of its statutory right of 
reimbursement from Defendant Farmers (because Farmers would have resisted 
reimbursement on the basis of "reasonable and necessary" speculation) was self-
interested. 
80. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP benefits violated 
public policy. 
81. The acts, omissions, and course of conduct alleged herein were outrageous and 
intolerable in that it offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality and said conduct was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages. 
82. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct were and 
are intended to and/or recklessly allowed to and did cause economic injury, physical 
injury, emotional and mental distress and were performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs' 
rights under the contract and Utah law. 
83. In order to deter such conduct of Defendant STATE FARM in the future, to 
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prevent repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial 
conduct uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for its callous and 
conscious disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be 
awarded according to proof at the time of trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
F I F T H CAUSE O F A C T I O N 
Against Defendant State Farm 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith ana Fair Dealing) 
84. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
85. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. 
86. Defendant STATE FARM agreed and contracted to act in good faith and to 
deal fairly with Plaintiffs when it issued the contract of insurance and accepted premiums 
from Plaintiffs; nevertheless, Defendant STATE FARM refused and failed to act in good 
faith and refused and failed to deal fairly or honestly with Plaintiffs. 
87. In the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so and with full knowledge 
and/or reckless disregard of the consequences, Defendant STATE FARM failed and 
refused to meet its obligations under the insurance policy and the laws of the State of 
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Utah. 
88. Defendant STATE FARM engaged in and engages in a course of conduct to 
further its own economic interest in violation of its fiduciary, contractual, 
implied/constructive, and statutory obligations to Plaintiffs including, but not limited to: 
a. Arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits; 
b. Intimidating claims practices; 
c. Imposition of undisclosed, unlawful, and impossible-to-satisfy burdens 
of proof and conditions; 
d. Failure to be objective in investigating and adjusting Plaintiffs' claim; 
and 
e. Taking actions that injured Plaintiffs' ability to obtain the benefits of the 
contract of insurance and the benefits provided under Utah law. 
89. Defendant STATE FARM rendered it difficult or impossible for Plaintiffs to 
continue performance and then attempted to take advantage of the non-performance it had 
caused. 
90. Defendant STATE FARM had a good faith claims-handling duty to disclose 
all possible bases for insurance coverage, yet it failed to disclose all possible bases for 
insurance coverage and failed to search to find coverage. 
91. Defendant STATE FARM acted intentionally and with a reckless disregard of 
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Plaintiffs' circumstances and the likelihood that its actions would cause Plaintiffs to 
suffer bodily injury and emotional and mental distress and/or at all times acted to further 
its own economic interest at the expense of Plaintiffs' economic interest, mental health, 
and physical well-being. 
92. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant STATE FARM, 
Plaintiffs has suffered emotional and mental distress, all to their general damage, in an 
amount to be proved at trial. 
93. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant STATE 
FARM, Plaintiffs has incurred and will incur economic detriment including, but not 
limited to, loss of insurance coverage, loss of credit, attorney fees, costs and expenses of 
litigation, and other damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
94. Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay Plaintiffs' PIP expenses was willful 
and malicious conduct or conduct which manifested a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of Plaintiffs. 
95. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct are 
contrary to (and constitute the breach of Defendant STATE FARM'S fiduciary duties 
owed to its insured arising under) the public policy of the State of Utah as set forth in the 
statutes and judicial determinations thereof, and Plaintiffs was proximately injured 
thereby in an amount to be proven at trial. 
23 
96. Defendant STATE FARM bears the burden of showing its good faith and fair 
dealing relating to the investigation and evaluation that precipitated its refusal to provide 
PIP benefits. 
97. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct were and 
are intended to, and/or recklessly allowed to, and did cause economic injury, physical 
injury, emotional and mental distress and were performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs' 
rights under the contract and Utah law. 
98. In order to deter such conduct of Defendant STATE FARM in the future, to 
prevent repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial 
conduct uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for its callous and 
conscious disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be 
awarded according to proof at the time of trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
SDCTH C A U S E O F A C T I O N 
Against Defendant State Farm 
(Misrepresentation ana/or Fraud) 
99. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
100. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure by the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. 
101. Defendant STATE FARM represented that Plaintiffs was not entitled to PIP 
benefits and that he bore undisclosed burdens of proof in attempting to perform their 
contractual duties. 
102. Defendant STATE FARM'S representations and omissions concerned then-
presently existing material facts regarding the scope of coverage provided by its insurance 
policy and obligations of the parties under the terms of the policy, and Defendant STATE 
FARM'S representations were false in that Plaintiffs was, in fact, entitled to the payment 
of all PIP benefits as set forth above upon a showing of reasonable proof which was, in 
fact, provided. 
103. Defendant STATE FARM knew that Plaintiffs was entitled to the full 
payment of PIP benefits, or Defendant STATE FARM recklessly refused to pay 
Plaintiffs' PIP benefits knowing that it had insufficient knowledge upon which to base its 
representations to the contrary. 
104. Defendant STATE FARM made the above-described representations for the 
purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to act upon the representations through ceasing or reducing 
treatment for their injuries and/or through the abandonment of their rights under the 
insurance contract and Utah law as a result of Defendant STATE FARM'S imposition of 
impossible-to-satisfy burdens. 
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105. After being induced to inaction and without knowledge of the falsity of 
Defendant STATE FARM'S representations and omissions, Plaintiffs permitted their 
medical bills and other financial obligations to accrue interest and penalties and 
reasonably decreased the frequency and altered the manner of treating their injuries 
contrary to the instructions given by their medical practitioners all as a direct and 
proximate result of and in reliance upon Defendant STATE FARM'S refusal to pay PIP 
benefits. 
106. Plaintiffs' injuries were enhanced, their enjoyment of life was impaired, and 
other health and mental well-being problems together with financial detriment were 
proximately caused by Defendant STATE FARM'S unlawful denial of PIP benefits and 
Plaintiffs' reliance thereon. 
107. Defendant STATE FARM'S acts, omissions, and course of conduct were and 
are intended to and/or recklessly allowed to and did cause economic injury, physical 
injury, emotional and mental distress and were performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs' 
rights under the contract and Utah law. 
108. In order to deter such conduct of Defendant STATE FARM in the future, to 
prevent repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial 
conduct uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for its callous and 
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conscious disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be 
awarded according to proof at the time of trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Against Defendants Farmers Insurance Exchange & Marble 
{Aiding a Fiduciary to Make Secret Profits) 
109. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
110. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble knew that 
Defendant STATE FARM and Plaintiffs were parties to an insurance contract under 
which Defendant STATE FARM owed PIP benefits to Plaintiffs — a fiduciary 
relationship. 
111. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble aided and 
abetted Defendant STATE FARM in not providing PIP benefits to Plaintiffs. 
112. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble encouraged 
Defendant STATE FARM to refuse to pay any PIP benefits that any person described as 
not "reasonable and necessary." 
113. As a result of Defendant STATE FARM'S asserted reliance upon the 
assertions of Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and the services of Defendant 
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Marble, Defendant STATE FARM made secret profits by retaining Plaintiffs' premium 
without paying the promised PIP benefits. 
114. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble are jointly 
liable with Defendant STATE FARM for the amount that should have been paid to 
Plaintiffs in PIP benefits. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
E I G H T H C A U S E O F A C T I O N 
Agfainst Defendants Farmers Insurance Excnangfe & Marble 
(Intentional Interference with Present Contractual Relations) 
115. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
116. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble intentionally 
interfered with Plaintiffs' existing economic relations by improper means (i.e., by 
demanding and providing "medical management" services in order to attempt to 
legitimize Defendant STATE FARM'S breach of contract in violation of Utah law). 
117. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange and Defendant Marble intentionally 
interfered with Plaintiffs' present contractual relations by improperly inducing or otherwise 
causing STATE FARM not to perform the contract, and Plaintiffs were thereby injured. 
118. Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange's and Defendant Marble's acts, 
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and did cause economic injury, physical injury, emotional and mental distress and were 
performed in utter disregard for Plaintiffs' rights under the contract and Utah law. 
119. In order to deter such conduct of said Defendants in the future, to prevent 
repetition thereof as a practice, to make repetition of such repetitive antisocial conduct 
uneconomical, and by way of punishment and example for their callous and conscious 
disregard of public health and safety, Plaintiffs pray that punitive damages be awarded 
according to proof at the time of trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demands judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1) For Declaratory Relief in the form of a proper interpretation no-fault statute 
specifically setting forth the relative rights and obligations of the parties and an injunction 
against State Farm's future bad-faith breaches of contract based upon its untenable 
interpretation of its fiduciary, contractual and statutory obligations; 
2) For the disgorgement of all profits or other benefits accruing to Defendant 
State Farm because of its possession and use of capital that should have been paid to 
Plaintiffs as PIP benefits under the insurance policy's no-fault coverage; 
3) For interest on the unpaid PIP benefits accruing and compounding at the rate 
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3) For interest on the unpaid PIP benefits accruing and compounding at the rate 
of 1 Vi% per month and other prejudgment interest accruing at the legal rate; 
4) For reasonable costs and attorney fees including all litigation costs and 
damages down to the time of trial, including expert witness fees; 
5) For the value of the PIP benefits Plaintiffs are entitled to under the insurance 
policy in the principal amount of $3,521.00; 
6) For damages arising out of emotional distress, mental anguish, increased 
physical pain and suffering, loss of (or injury to) credit, interest costs and penalties; 
7) For punitive damages in such amounts as shall be established by proof at 
trial; and 
8) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just in the premises. 
DATED this /J? day of September, 2000. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
ei 
TREltfT J. WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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MATLTNG CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this day of September, 2000, to: 
Maye Helen Potter 
1211 W. Highway 32 
Oakley, Utah 84055 
Mr. Harold L. Petersen 
PETERSEN & HANSEN 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
TRENT^VADDOUPS 
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Exhibit C 
April 5. 1996 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy 
UTAH 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in the State of 
Utah. Rease read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that it provides. You may call the company 
to help and assist you in any questions that you have. 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
P. O.Box571310 
Murray, Utah 84157-1310 
The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named 
in the Declarations and Policy. 
4/96 Ed. 
statute as follows: 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses 
shall not exceed $3,000.00; unless additional medical 
protection or payments are provided for on the 
Declaration page, they must be incurred within three 
years of the date of the accident to be payable; 
Work Loss: 
The maximum amount payable for work loss is eighty-
five percent of any loss of gross income and earning 
capacity, not to exceed the total of $250.00 per 
week; 
Special Damage: 
A special damage allowance not exceeding $20.00 
per day for inability to perform services for his 
household; 
Funeral Expenses: 
The maximum amount payable for funeral expenses 
shall not exceed $1,500.00; 
Survivor Loss: 
The amount payable for survivor loss is $3,000.00 
and is payable only to natural persons who are the 
eligible injured person's heirs. 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability 
and Special Provisions 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur 
during the policy period in this state, the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or Canada, except if an auto 
accident to which this policy applies occurs outside of 
Utah, {but is within the United States and Canada), our 
limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as 
follows: 
1. If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has: 
a. a personal injury protection or similar law 
specifying limits higher than that in the 
declarations, your policy will provide the 
higher specified limit; 
b. compulsory personal injury protection 
insurance or similar law requiring a non-
resident to maintain personal injury protection 
insurance, whenever the non-resident uses a 
vehicle in that state or Canada, your policy 
will provide at least the required minimum 
amounts and types of coverage; 
c. no compulsory personal injury protection 
insurance or similar law requiring a non-
resident to maintain insurance, whenever the 
insured uses a vehicle in that state or 
Canada, your policy does not provide for any 
benefits under Part B, Personal Injury 
Coverage, to non-residents of the State of 
Utah, except for medical expenses under this 
section, not to exceed $3,000.00; 
Pan** fi 
d. no compulsory personal injury protection 
insurance or similar law requiring a non-
resident to maintain insurance in that state or 
Canada, your policy does not provide benefits 
under this section to residents of the State of 
Utah who are not family members in any 
amount in excess of the minimum limits as 
provided for this type of coverage in the 
State of Utah. 
2. Any amount payable by the Company under the 
terms of this coverage shall be reduced by the 
amount paid, payable, or required to be provided 
on account of such bodily injury: 
a. under any worker's compensation plan or any 
similar statutory plan; 
b. which that person receives or is entitled to 
receive from the United States or any of its 
agencies because he is on active duty in the 
military service. 
3. That where a Covered Person under this policy is 
or would be held legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to whom 
benefits required under personal injury protection 
provisions of this policy have been paid by the 
injured party's insurance carrier, including the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the 
Company if it would be legally held liable shall 
reimburse the insurance company of the other 
party for the payments as provided herein, but 
not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement in its amount shall be mandatory 
binding arbitration between the two insurance 
companies providing for insurance coverage as 
herein set forth. 
4. If the Covered Person incurs medical expenses 
which are unreasonable or unnecessary, we may 
refuse to pay for those medical expenses and 
contest them. Unreasonable medical expenses 
are fees for medical services which are higher 
than the usual and customary charges for those 
services; unnecessary medical expenses are fees 
for medical services which "are not usually and 
customarily performed for treatment of the injury, 
including fees for an excessive number, amount, 
or duration of medical services. 
5. If the Covered Person is sued by a medical 
services provider because we refuse to pay 
contested medical expenses, we will pay all 
defense costs and any resulting judgment against 
the Covered Person. We have the right to choose 
the counsel. The Covered Person must cooperate 
with us in the defense of any claim, demand or 
lawsuit. If the Covered Person is required to 
attend any trials or hearings and wages or 
salaries are lost as a result, we will pay up to 
$35.00 per day. 
Exhibit D 
The Honorable James Doerty 
SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY 
MINDY SITTON; JESUS BANCACO; IRIS I 
SALTER; RICHARD BAKER; JOANE NO. 00-2-10013-2SEA 
ROOSE; and VIRGIE HARRIS, individually 
and on behalf of all others similarly situated in ORDER GRANTING CLASS 
the State of Washington, CERTIFICATION 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurer, 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER came on before the Honorable Jim Doerty, Judge of the King County 
Superior Court, upon the plaintiffs' motion for an order certifying this case as a class action. The 
Court, having reviewed the briefs and attachments of the parties, considered the applicable law, 
analyzed the prerequisites for class certification under CR 23, and considered the arguments of 
counsel, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED; 
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The criteria for class certification under CR 23(a) are met. The number of claimants 
satisfies the numerosity requirement. CR 23(a)(1). There are common questions of law or fact 
ORDER GRANTING CLASS CERTIFICATION - 1 
200 Second Venue Hest 
Seattle UA9811U 
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present. CR 23(a)(2). The claims of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the class. CR 
23(a)(3). The named plaintiffs are representative of the class as a whole and plaintiffs' counsel is 
experienced in class action litigation. CR 23(a)(4). Q \^J • 
2. In addition, the criteria under Rule 23(b)(1), (2) s^M^are met. Th<&o&? 
6 s}>gc|fitalj!^^ 
8
 3. The certified class is defined as: 
9nS 
All persons in the State of Washington who, within the last six years, were 
i o insured by State Farm for personal injury protection (PIP) and who 
sustained injuries in a covered occurrence (motor vehicle accident) and 
1 ]
 who submitted a PIP claim to State Farm for medical expenses which was 
referred to an external medical utilization review, and who were denied or 
1 2 
limited in the PIP benefits by State Farm based on such review. 
4. The plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare a form of order providing notice to the class of 
this case. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of ^0 iMMlLh , 2000. 
J4T o ^ ^ 7 
)N.JIMDOERTY 
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 
Presented by: 
STRITMATTER KESSLER WHELAN WITHEY COLUCCIO 
MICHAEL E. WITHEY, WSBA #4787 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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together with a copy of a complaint, as pro-
vided in rule 4 or by filing a complaint."7 
[5] It is undisputed that Sievers waited 
only 59 days after filing her tort claim with 
the City before commencing her suit in supe-
rior court. She claims it was necessary to 
file her action with the court on the Friday 
preceding the expiration of the applicable 
statute of limitations because the 60th day of 
the notice claim statute fell on Saturday, a 
day when the courts were not open. She 
asserts that if she waited until the following 
Monday the applicable statute of limitation 
would have run. Given the facts before us, 
the argument has no merit. 
It is settled case law that final Saturdays 
are to be excluded when computing statute of 
limitations periods.8 In addition, the Legisla-
ture, in 1997, amended RCW 1.12.040 (com-
putation of time) adding Saturdays to the 
already excluded Sundays and holidays for 
the computation of time when the last day of 
the penod falls on such a day.9 Thus, given 
the fact that Sievers waited until the last 
possible day to file her notice of claim with 
the City before the running of the limitation 
period, it was necessary to properly count 
the days under the statutes and court rules 
to discover that the only (last) possible day to 
commence the action here would have been 
on Monday, October 20, 1997, a date in com-
pliance with the 60-day waiting rule mandat-
ed by RCW 4.96.020(4) and within the appli-
cable statute of limitation. 
Although seemingly harsh, this case is an 
excellent illustration^ of the dangers 
fraught with waiting to file claim notices or 
complaints on the last day of the applicable 
limitation period. 
The decision of • the trial court is affirmed. 
COLEMAN, and ELLINGTON, JJ., con-
cur. 
Co I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
7. CR 3(a) (emphasis added) 
8. Stik.es Woods Neighborhood Ass'n v City of La-
cey, 124 Wash 2d 459, 466, 880 P 2d 25 (1994) 
9. RCW 1 12 040 provides 
Tina VAN NOY; Patricia Faye Dinnis 
(formerly Patricia Faye Burkett); and 
Elaine Ebersole; on behalf of them-
selves and all others similarly situated, 
Appellants, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY and State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Re-
spondents. 
No. 41128-4-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
June 1, 1999. 
Publication Ordered Sept. 1, 1999. 
Insureds brought suit against automo-
bile insurer, alleging breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith claims 
handling and violation of Consumer Practice 
Act, arising when insurer disallowed personal 
injury protection (PIP) claims for medical 
expenses more than 30 days after automobile 
insurer received the claim. Class action certi-
fication was granted. The Superior Court, 
King County, Robert Lasnik, J., denied in-
sureds' motion for partial summary judgment 
on issues of duty and breach and granted 
insurer's cross motion for summary judg-
ment on claims in their entirety. Insureds 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Grosse, J., 
held that material issues of fact, regarding 
handling of claims and whether insurer's dis-
closures were sufficient to enable insureds to 
protect their interests, precluded summary 
judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance ®=>1863 
Interpretation of insurance policies is a 
question of law. 
The time within which an act is to be done, 
as herein provided, shall be computed by ex-
cluding the first day, and including the last, 
unless the last day is a holiday, Saturday, or 
Sunday, and then it is also excluded 
Laws of 1997, ch 125, § 1, effective July 27, 
1997 
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2. Insurance <s=>1820 
Insurance policy language is interpreted 
as it would be understood by the average 
person, rather than technically. 
3. Insurance <3=>1808 
Ambiguities exist if insurance policy lan-
guage is susceptible to two reasonable inter-
pretations. 
4. Insurance e»1832(l) 
If the court cannot resolve any ambigui-
ty by resort to extrinsic evidence, then the 
ambiguity in an insurance policy is construed 
in favor of an insured. 
5. Insurance <&=*1866 
Fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship 
exists between an insurer and its insured-
6. Insurance <&=>1866,1867 
An insurer has an enhanced fiduciary 
obligation that rises to a level higher than 
that of mere honesty and lawfulness of pur-
pose; it requires an insurer to deal fairly with 
an insured, giving equal consideration in all 
matters to the insured's interests as well as 
its own. 
7. Judgment <S»181(23) 
Material issue of fact, as to whether 
automobile insurer fully, timely, or adequate-
ly disclosed, through policy terms and initial 
notice following receipt of claim form, possi-
bility of retroactive denial of personal injury 
protection (PIP) medical claims later than 
30-day payment period provided by policy, 
precluded summary judgment in class action 
alleging breach of fiduciary duties. 
8. Insurance <3=>1869 
An insurer may not restrict coverage or 
otherwise alter terms of an insurance con-
tract with subsequent letters and notices-
9. Insurance @=>3164 
Term "proof in personal injury protec-
tion (PIP) policy provision stating that medi-
cal expenses would be paid within 30 days of 
receipt of "proof of amount due" meant suffi-
cient notice to allow insurer to evaluate its 
rights and liabilities and to investigate claim. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
10. Judgment <S=>181(23) 
Material issue of fact, as to whether 
automobile insurer acted reasonably or 
breached policy terms when it failed to ap-
prise insureds as to progress of investigation 
of their personal injury protection (PIP) 
claims after giving them initial notice that it 
was evaluating claims, precluded summary 
judgment on breach of contract claim of in-
sureds who were denied coverage after initial 
claims payment period. 
11. Consumer Protection <£»6 
In order to recover damages under the 
Consumer Protection Act (CPA), a private 
party must prove that the defendant's act or 
practice (1) is unfair and deceptive; (2) oc-
curs in the conduct of trade or commerce; 
(3) affects the public interest; (4) causes 
injury to the plaintiffs business or property; 
and (5) causes the injury suffered. West's 
RCWA 19.86.090 
12. Consumer Protection <3=>6 
Proof that alleged act constitutes a per 
se unfair trade practice establishes that act is 
unfair and deceptive and occurs in conduct of 
trade or commerce for purposes of Consumer 
Protection Act claim. West's RCWA 
19.86.090 
13. Judgment <3=>181(23) 
Genuine issue of material fact, as to 
whether automobile insurer engaged in un-
fair claims settlement practices or misrepre-
sented its policy provisions, when it failed to 
provide more than initial form notice of po-
tential need for additional time to investigate 
personal injury protection (PIP) claim, pre-
cluded summary judgment on Insureds' 
claims under Consumer Protection Act. 
West's RCWA 19.86.090, 48.30.010. 
14. Consumer Protection (S=>6 
Insurance @=»3335 
Harm from an insurer's bad faith acts is 
an element of every action for bad faith 
handling of a claim or violation of the Con-
sumer Protection Act (CPA). West's RCWA 
19.86.090. 
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15. Insurance <s»3361 record before us suggests there is a justicia-
Viability of claim for bad faith investiga- ble controversy as to whether the insurance 
tion of personal injury protection (PIP) company followed, or breached this policy 
claims, arising from delayed action on claims, requirement. Summary judgment was 
was not dependent on whether automobile granted in error. The decision below is re-
insurer was ultimately correct in determining versed and the case remanded for trial, 
that coverage did not exist. 
FACTS 
Steve W. Berman, Erin K. Flory, Carl H. 
Hagens, Hagens, Berman, Seattle, WA, for 
Appellants. 
Peter A. Danelo, Daniel J. Dunne, Jr., and 
Robin E. Wechkin, Heller, Ehrman, White & 
McAuliffe, Seattle, WA, for Respondents. 
GROSSE, J. 
Insurers have a general duty of good faith 
in dealing with their insureds. Here, in a 
class action lawsuit, the representatives of 
the class (hereinafter representatives) have 
met their initial burden of producing issues 
of material fact concerning the good faith 
handling of the claims sufficient to survive 
summary judgment. In addition, a quasifi-
duciary relationship exists between an insur-
er and its insured. Here, there is also a 
question of fact as to whether State Farm 
Insurance Companies (State Farm) suffi-
ciently disclosed pertinent facts to enable its 
insureds to protect their interests surround-
ing the companies' retroactive denial of 
claims. Further, under Coventry Associates 
v American States Insurance Co.,1 an in-
sured may maintain an action against an 
insurer for bad faith investigation of the in-
sured's claim and for a claimed violation of 
the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) even if 
the insurer is ultimately correct in determin-
ing coverage does not exist. The representa-
tives have met the mitial threshold burden. 
The insurance policy requires a 30-day set-
tlement period, or timely notice of denial, or 
reasons for any delay. At a minimum, the 
1. Coventry Associates v American States Ins Co , 
136 Wash 2d 269, 961 P 2d 933 (1998) 
2. To illustrate the type of claims at issue here 
1 Class representative Tina Van Noy was in-
jured in an automobile accident in mid-October 
of 1993 She was insured by State Farm with 
coverage including PIP and medical payments 
coverage first party benefits As prescribed by 
The class action was initiated in 1994 by 
three State Farm policyholders, Tina Van 
Noy, Patricia Faye Dinnis (formerly Patricia 
Fay Burkett), and Elaine Ebersole. The 
complaint asserted bad faith claims handling, 
a breach of fiduciary duty, breach of con-
tract, and a violation of the Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act. 
Class certification was granted for a state-
wide class of State Farm personal injury 
protection (PIP) policyholders. The claims 
were for the medical expenses of injured 
insureds that were retroactively disallowed 
more than 30 days after State Farm received 
the claim. 
All of the representatives, and the entire 
class, were subject to a number of claims 
that were retroactively denied after a medi-
cal review was done by or for State Farm. 
The allegation on appeal is that State Farm 
breached its policy by failing to timely pay, 
or in the alternative by not properly notify-
ing or extending within the 30-day period for 
settling claims. 
In October 1996, the representatives 
moved for partial summary judgment on the 
issues of duty and breach. State Farm op-
posed the motion and made a cross motion 
for summary judgment seeking dismissal of 
the claims in their entirety. The trial court 
issued a ruling, without oral opinion or writ-
ten reasoning, denying the partial summary 
judgment brought by the representatives, 
but granting State Farm's motion dismissing 
all claims in their entirety.2 
her healthcare provider, she commenced treat-
ment for her injuries including chiropractic, 
physical, and massage therapy A claim was 
filed Three weeks after receiving claims for 
benefits, State Farm sent a form letter to Van 
Noy advising her that State Farm would pay only 
necessary medical expenses and that State Farm 
may require a second opinion from a doctor at 
her expense The letter did not state that State 
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The dispute arises over language in State 
Farm policies that includes a "What We Pay" 
section which provides 
We will pay for bodily injury to an insured 
caused by accident resulting from the 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a 
motor vehicle 
1 Medical Expenses These are rea-
sonable expenses incurred within three 
years of the date of the accident These 
expenses are for necessary 
a medical, surgical, X-ray and 
rehabilitative services[ ] 
The "Settlement of Loss" portion of the 
policies provides 
Payments will be made on a monthly basis 
within 30 days after we have proof of the 
amount due 
The same section further provides 
The amount erne under this coverage shan 
be decided by agreement If the insured 
and we cannot agree, it will be decided by 
arbitration upon mutual written consent 
Farm might curtail payment either prospectively 
or retroactively or that there was any risk that it 
would determine that the expenses as a result of 
her healthcare provider s prescriptions were not 
necessary It did not ask her to obtain prior 
approval before seeking further treatment A 
little over five months after the accident State 
Farm sent Van Noy an additional letter which 
stated that it had not yet determined whether her 
care was necessary and that it would be send 
ing her bills to an independent consultant 
Two months later State Farm notified Van Noy 
what claims it considered necessary and that 
. payment had been made on those claims State 
Farm indicated there was an additional bill from 
a doctor and a fluoroscopy exam that were still 
undergoing peer review and that the company 
would notify her of its decision regarding these 
claims The letter did not indicate any proce-
dure to resolve the rejected claims further or 
seek additional information This notice did not 
indicate that Van Noy had any arbitration rights 
under the policy It did indicate however that 
if she had anv questions she should call a certain 
claims representative Because of this rejection 
of certain chiropractic and massage claims Van 
Noy became personally liable several months af 
ter the fact for these health care claims she 
believed were being covered 
2 Patricia Faye Dmnis was injured m an 
automobile accident on May 10 1993 She com-
menced medical treatment prescribed by her 
medical provider In June 1993 her bills were 
forwarded to State Farm State Farm waited for 
Th£ representative claimants received let-
ters from State Farm after filing their 
claims Each letter reiterated the particular 
policy coverage and that the medical ex-
penses covered must be "reasonable and nec-
essary" State Farm also stated that the 
bills rnight be submitted for evaluation by a 
professional review board or other outside 
independent agency3 
[1-4] The representatives challenge State 
Farm's claims procedures, asserting that 
they are highly retroactive and result in uni-
lateral denial of claims that negatively affect 
the interests of State Farm's insureds. The 
usual standard of review applies,4 as do the 
principles for interpretation of insurance pol-
icies 5 
Fiduciary Relationship 
[5, G] A fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary rela-
tionship exists between an \ns\arer and its 
insured An insurer has an enhanced fidu-
ciary obligation that rises to a level higher 
than that of mere honesty and lawfulness of 
four months before notifying Dmnis that it was 
sending her bills out for peer review and did not 
specifically indicate or warn her that these pre 
scribed claims might be rejected Seven months 
after the accident, State Farm sent her notice 
that the majority of her claims for treatment was 
denied 
3 State Farm later conceded that its policies did 
not specifically authorize outside reviews until it 
changed its policies after July 1 1994 
4 Summary judgement may be granted if there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
The court view> all facts and reasonable infer 
ences therefrom most favorably towards the non 
moving party when ruling on a summary judg 
ment motion Weyerhaeuser Co v Aetna Casual 
ty & Surety Co 123 Wash 2d 891, 897 874 P 2d 
142 (1994) 
5 Interpretation of insurance policies is a ques-
tion of law and the policy language is interpreted 
as it vvould be understood by the average person 
rather than technically Ambiguities if an> ex-
ist if the language is susceptible to two reason 
able interpretations If the court cannot resolve 
any ambiguity by resort to extrinsic evidence 
then the ambiguity m an insurance policy is 
construed m favor of an insured American Star 
Ins Co v Gnce 121 Wash 2d 869 874-75 854 
p 2d 622 (1993) opinion supplemented 123 
Wash 2d 131 865 P 2d 507 (1994) 
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purpose. It requires an insurer to deal fairly 
with an insured, giving equal consideration in 
all matters to the insured's interests as well 
as its own.6 
The representatives argue that State Farm 
owed and violated three overlapping fiducia-
ry duties to its insureds: (1) the duty to 
disclose all facts that would aid its insureds 
in protecting their interests; (2) the duty of 
equal consideration; and (3) the duty not to 
mislead its insureds. 
[7] Whether or not breach of any of these 
duties is ultimately supported, at a minimum 
there is a factual question in this case wheth-
er State Farm fully, timely, or adequately 
disclosed the possibility of the retroactive7 
denial of medical claims. State Farm argues 
that its policies and its subsequent communi-
cations with the insureds make it clear that 
claims may be denied retroactively and thus 
there can be no issue of improper notice or 
failure to disclose. We disagree. While the 
notice from State Farm and the policy itself 
state that State Farm will only pay for "rea-
sonable and necessary" medical expenses, 
whether that notice sufficiently discloses that 
State Farm may deny claims significantly 
later than the 30 days, without giving addi-
tional interim notices or reasoning as con-
templated by the insurance policy and the 
Washington Insurance Regulations remains a 
question for the trier of fact.8 
[8] We do not agree with the suggestion 
made by the representatives that State 
Farm be strictly held to 30 days within 
which to make a final decision, but it must be 
determined whether the notices given pro-
vide sufficient disclosure of the possibility of 
retroactive denial when the insurer knows 
the claimant is receiving treatment at the 
suggestion of his or her healthcare provider. 
6. McGreevy v Oregon Mutual Ins Co., 128 
Wash 2d 26, 36-37, 904 P 2d 731 (1995) (citing 
Tank v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105 
Wash 2d 381, 385-86, 715 P 2d 1133 (1986)) 
7. State Farm uses the word "retrospective" rath-
er than retroactive 
8. We are not holding that State Farm is prohibit-
ed by the policy's 30-day deadline from investi-
gating claims beyond that period, but find it must 
be determined whether or not additional notice 
or disclosure is required or necessary 
Further, there is a question as to whether 
the delay of a number of months, without 
additional notice, is reasonable. An insurer 
may not restrict coverage or otherwise alter 
terms of an insurance contract with subse-
quent letters and notices.9 The issue is not 
one of coverage, but is one of the process for 
resolving claims.10 
Indeed, a letter from the Washington State 
Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC) 
to State Farm, with regard to the claim of 
another potential class member, noted that it 
had long been OIC's position that an insurer 
cannot treat an insured equitably and fairly 
by denying payment of incurred medical ex-
penses on a retroactive basis. 
Contractual Breach of the Policy: 
The representatives claim the policy re-
quires State Farm to pay or deny claims 
within 30 days, or give proper and timely 
notice and reasoning to support a delay. 
State Farm counters that to reach this con-
clusion the class had to prove (1) that the 
contract as a whole equates "proof of the 
amount due" with the mere submission of 
medical bills, and (2) that a promise to pay 
claims within 30 days necessarily equates to 
a promise to deny claims within the same 30 
days. The representatives argue that the 
required "proof of amount due" is met when 
an insured submits a claim on State Farm's 
proof-of-claim form with requisite billing 
from a medical professional. 
[9,10] The policy does not expressly de-
fine "proof of amount due," but a resort to 
Washington case law indicates that "proof 
means sufficient notice to allow insurers to 
evaluate their rights and liabilities and to 
investigate claims.11 The case of Reichl v 
9. See RCW 48 18 190, policy must contain the 
entire contract 
10. It is unnecessary to discuss all the claims set 
forth here, such as whether the policy allows the 
review of claims by outside review agencies or 
boards 
11. See Towey v New York Life Ins Co, 27 
Wash 2d 829, 834-35, 180 P 2d 815 (1947), see 
also, Fox v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co, 61 
Wash 2d 636, 639, 379 P 2d 724 (1963) 
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co.,12 cited by State Farm, is distinguishable. 
In Reichl the claimant failed to timely pro-
vide additional proof or information sought 
by the insurer before full settlement of 
claims with another insured. In the instant 
case, after receiving the claim on State 
Farm's own proof of claim forms, State Farm 
properly notified its insureds that it was in 
the process of evaluating the claim, but later 
failed to apprise the insured as to what was 
happening with the claim. The resulting is-
sue is the reasonableness of State Farm's 
actions in handling the claim under its policy 
of insurance. This should be determined by 
a trier of fact. Whether a breach actually 
occurred will turn on the facts presented. 
Washington insurance regulations are in-
structive.13 WAC 284-30-370 indicates that 
every insurer shall complete an investigation 
of a claim within 30 days after notification of 
a claim, unless the investigation cannot rea-
sonably be completed. WAC 284-30-380(1) 
provides that after an insurer receives a 
properly executed proof of loss, it must in-
form the insured of its decision to accept or 
deny the claim within 15 days. WAC 284-
30-380(3) then sets forth the insurer's notice 
obligations or procedures if it cannot resolve 
the claim, or a portion of the claim within 
that period. The insurer first must notify 
the insured within 15 days that it needs more 
time to resolve the claim and give the rea-
son therefore. Thirty days later (within 45 
days of the filing of the proof of loss) if the 
insurer still cannot resolve the claim, it must 
again notify the insured and again explain 
the reason for the delay. The insurer must 
continue to notify the insured every 30 days 
until the claim is resolved. 
State Farm did not follow these notice 
requirements. After its initial request for 
more information, State Farm failed to in-
form any of these plaintiffs/appellants about 
the progress of its investigations, until some 
four to six months later when it notified the 
12. Reichl v State Farm Mutual Auto his Co , 75 
Wash App 452, 880 P.2d 558 (1994) 
13. See Clements v Travelers Indemnity Co, 121 
Wash 2d 243, 254, 850 P 2d 1298 (1993) 
14. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc v Safe-
co Title Ins Co, 105 Wash 2d 778, 784-85, 719 
P 2d 531 (1986) 
ce insureds that a large portion of their claims 
e. was being denied. Although these regula-
o  tions may better address potential bad faith 
i and CPA claims rather than a breach of 
f contract issue, they also support the argu-
i  ment of the representatives that State Farm 
£ breached its contractual duties to pay or 
rci properly inform the claimant of progress, 
i  
*r Unfair or Deceptive Practices—CPA Claim: 
^ [11,12] In order to recover damages un-
*~ der the CPA, a private party must prove that 
 the defendant's acts or practice (1) is unfair 
y and deceptive; (2) occurs in the conduct of 
y trade or commerce; (3) affects the public 
J interest; (4) causes injury to the plaintiffs 
* business or property; (5) causes the injury 
t- suffered.14 The first two elements may be 
&> established by showing that the alleged act 
n
 constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.15 
In Doumie v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
'" Co.,16 this court held that for the purposes of 
' WAC 284-30-380, under which an insurer 
has 15 days bo accept, deny, or reject a claim 
or give reasons why more time is needed, an 
insurer's reasonable need to acquire addition-
al information and investigate is a valid rea-
" son for an extension of time. In that case 
the court found that State Farm properly 
informed its insured within 15 days, and then 
again informed Downie a month later what 
\ was necessary to complete its investigation, 
thus within the 45 days required. State 
a Farm did not violate the regulation. Here, 
L unlike in Doumie, State Farm failed to re-
j spond further after the initial notice of its 
|. potential need to investigate further. 
J [13] At a minimum there is a question of 
fact as to whether State Farm engaged in 
; unfair claims settlement practices as defined 
• in WAC 284-30-330, or whether it misrepre-
- sented its policy provisions as proscribed by 
: WAC 284-30-350. A single violation of any 
\ of those sections constitutes a violation of 
i RCW 48.30.010. Under RCW 19.86.170, a 
15. Urban v Mid-Century Ins Co., 79 Wash.App 
798, 805, 905 P.2d 404 (1995) 
16. Downie v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 84 
Wash.App. 577, 585-86, 929 P.2d 484 (1997) 
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violation of RCW 48.30.010 is a per se unfair 
trade practice and satisfies the first element 
of the five-part test for bringing a CPA 
action under RCW 19.86.090.17 
[14] State Farm argues that even if its 
procedures are in violation of insurance trade 
practices, the representatives did not and 
cannot prove harm or damages. Without 
proving harm, there is no violation of the 
CPA or bad faith claims.18 Harm from an 
insurer's bad faith acts is an element of every 
action for bad faith handling of a claim or 
violation of the CPA. 
However, as asserted by the representa-
tives, the delay in determining the amount 
covered caused economic harm by increasing 
personal liability to the members of the class. 
But for State Farm's delay, the class mem-
bers may not have incurred additional medi-
cal or therapy expenses. State Farm claims 
that the only damages for which it could be 
liable are the benefits due but not paid. We 
disagree. It appears that a determination 
could well be made that State Farm's prac-
tices result in the delay of claim resolutions 
that harm the insureds by the insureds seek-
ing a continuing course of medical or therapy 
treatment for which they may ultimately be 
deemed liable and which they would not have 
pursued had they known. There are ques-
tions of fact whether the claimants are dam-
aged. 
Bad Faith Handling of Claims: 
[15] The representatives claim the trial 
court erred in dismissing their action for bad 
faith handling of their claims. Our Supreme 
Court has held that a first party insured may 
maintain an action against its insurer for bad 
faith investigation of the insured's claim and 
violation of the CPA regardless of whether 
the insurer was ultimately correct in deter-
mining that coverage did not exist.19 The 
Court indicated that it agreed with one legal 
commentator who states: 
17. Industrial Indemnity Co of the Northwest, Inc 
v Kallevig, 114 Wash 2d 907, 925, 792 P 2d 520 
(1990) 
18. Coventry Associates v American States Ins 
Co, 136 Wash 2d 269, 961 P 2d 933 (1998) 
T OF SEATTLE Wash. 1135 
(WashApp Div. 1 1999) 
"The implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in the policy should necessarily 
require the insurer to conduct any neces-
sary investigation in a timely fashion and 
to conduct a reasonable investigation be-
fore denying coverage. In the event the 
insurer fails in either regard, it will have 
breached the covenant and, therefore, the 
policy.''^ 20] 
The implied covenant is breached whether 
the insured pays the claim or not, because its 
conduct may damage the protection that the 
insured sought to gain by buying insurance. 
Again, this claim was improperly dismissed 
on summary judgment. 
The decision of the trial court granting 
summary judgment to State Farm is re-
versed, and the case remanded for trial on 
the issues. 
ELLINGTON, J., and KENNEDY, C J., 
concur. 
Michael GIRTON, Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF SEATTLE, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Washington, Respondent. 
No. 42333-9-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
July 12, 1999. 
As Amended on Denial of Reconsideration 
and Partial Publication 
Ordered Sept. 8,1999. 
Property owner brought appeal under 
Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) after city 
20. Coventry Associates, 136 Wash 2d at 281, 961 
P 2d 933 (quoting 1 Allan D Windt, Insurance 
Claims & Disputes Representation of Insurance 
Companies and Insureds § 2 05, at 38 (3d 
ed 1995)) (emphasis added) 
19. Coventry Associates, 136 Wash 2d at 279, 961 
P 2d 933 
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tion, the interest of the person to be la-
beled goes beyond mere reputation. The 
interest cannot be captured in a single 
word or phrase. It is an interest in know-
ing when the government is moving 
against you and why it has singled you out 
for special attention. It is an interest in 
avoiding the secret machinations of a Star 
Chamber. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, it is an interest in avoiding the 
social ostracism, loss of employment oppor-
tunities, and significant likelihood of verbal 
and, perhaps, even physical harassment 
likely to follow from designation. In our 
view, that interest, when combined |63owith 
the obvious reputational interest that is at 
stake, qualifies as a "liberty" interest with-
in the meaning of the Due Process Clause. 
Noble, 964 P.2d at 996-97. 
I find myself in agreement with the rea-
soning of the Oregon and New Jersey courts 
and conclude, as did they, that the petition-
ers have a significant liberty interest in not 
having their reputation wrongly stigmatized 
by the government. I reach this conclusion 
because it is readily apparent to me that the 
degree to which information is released to 
the public about these offenders can have 
significant effect on their lives. As the Ore-
gon court observed, ostracism, loss of em-
ployment, and verbal and/or physical harass-
ment damages more than one's reputation 
and constitutes significant intrusions of one's 
liberty. Noble, 964 P.2d at 996. Iftheintru-
*sion is the result of an incorrect branding of 
one's reputation, this is not a trifling matter, 
but rather, is an injustice. In sum, I concur 
with the reasoning of the Oregon and New 
Jersey courts and would hold that before 
decisions are finally made as to the degree of 
public notification concerning the risk, if any, 
these offenders pose to the public, they 
should be provided with notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. 
Although the majority acknowledges a 
feeling of "discomfort" with the "seeming 
unfairness" of the process that these offend-
ers assail, it nevertheless sweeps its concerns 
aside indicating that the offenders have the 
remedy of seeking judicial review by writ of 
certiorari for an arbitrary or capricious clas-
sification. Majority op. at 571. This, in my 
view, is a hollow remedy since it would be 
after the fact and would be equivalent to 
"closing the barn door after the horse has 
been let out." In view of the considerable 
interest petitioners have in making certain 
that they are not disadvantaged economically 
or physically by an unjustifiable sullying of 
their reputation, offenders should not have 
their risk level finally determined and infor-
mation about them disseminated before they 
are afforded notice and hearing in order to 
assure that the information that is released 
to thej63iCommunity is not greater than what 
is "relevant and necessary" for the protection 
of the public. I would so hold. Because the 
majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully 
dissent. 
JOHNSON and SANDERS, JJ., concur. 
142 Wash 2d 784 
|784Tina VAN NOY; Patricia Faye Dinnis 
(formerly Patricia Faye Burkett); and 
Elaine Ebersole; on behalf of them-
selves and all others similarly situated, 
Respondents, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY and State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Peti-
tioner. 
No. 68548-7. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
En Banc. 
Argued June 29, 2000. 
Decided Jan. 18, 2001. 
Insureds brought suit against automo-
bile insurer to recover for breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith claims 
handling, and violation of Consumer Practice 
Act, arising when insurer disallowed personal 
injury protection (PIP) benefits for medical 
VAN NOY v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS 
Cite as 16 P3d 574 (Wash. 2001) 
expenses more than thirty days after the 6. Judgment e=»181(23) 
co. Wash. 575 
insurer received the claim. Class action certi-
fication was granted. The Superior Court, 
King County, Robert Lasnik, J., entered 
summary judgment in favor of the insurer. 
Insureds appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Grosse, J., 98 WasLApp. 487, 983 P.2d 1129, 
reversed and remanded. On review, The Su-
preme Court, Alexander, J., held that: (1) the 
insurer owed an elevated or enhanced fidu-
ciary or good faith obligation to deal fairly 
with its insureds, giving equal consideration 
in all matters to the insureds' interests as 
well as its own, and (2) factual issues preclud-
ed summary judgment on the contract claim. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Talmadge, J. pro tempore, concurred 
and filed opinion in which Johnson and Mad-
sen, JJ., concurred. 
1. Insurance <£=>3359 
Automobile insurer owed an elevated or 
enhanced fiduciary or good faith obligation to 
deal fairly with its insureds, giving equal 
consideration in all matters to the insureds' 
interests as well as its own in resolving 
claims for personal injury protection (PIP) 
benefits. 
2. Appeal and Error e=>893(l) 
Summary judgment orders are reviewed 
de novo. 
3. Judgment <3=*185(2, 6) 
Summary judgment will be granted, af-
ter considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, only if 
reasonable persons could reach but one con-
clusion. CR 56(c). 
4. Insurance <3=>1866 
A quasi-fiduciary relationship exists be-
tween an insurer and its insured. 
5. Insurance <S=>1866,1867, 3359 
Even in the first-party context, an insur-
er owes an elevated or enhanced fiduciary or 
good faith obligation to deal fairly with an 
insured, giving equal consideration in all mat-
ters to the insured's interests as well as its 
own. 
The reasonableness of an automobile in-
surer's handling of claims for personal injury 
protection (PIP) benefits was a genuine issue 
of material fact precluding summary judg-
ment on whether the insurer breached the 
contractual obligation to pay claims on a 
monthly basis within thirty days after receiv-
ing proof of the amount due. 
|786Peter Anthony Danelo, Daniel J. Dunne, 
Robin E. Wechkin, Kenneth E. Payson, Se-
attle, for Petitioner. 
Steven W. Berman, Sean R. Matt, Andrew 
M. Volk, Erin K. Flory, Seattle, for Respon-
dents. 
ALEXANDER, J. 
This appeal had its inception when a group 
of State Farm Insurance Company (State 
Farm) policyholders commenced a class ac-
tion against State Farm claiming that the 
insurance company breached fiduciary and 
contractual obligations, acted in bad faith, 
and violated the Consumer Protection Act 
(chapter 19.86 RCW). The trial court grant-
ed State Farm's motion for summary judg-
ment and dismissed the plaintiffs' causes of 
action. The Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court, concluding that there were mate-
rial issues of fact which precluded summary 
judgment in favor of State Farm. State Farm 
obtained review here, claiming that the Court 
of Appeals (1) erred in its formulation of the 
fiduciary duty owed by State Farm to its 
insureds, and (2) neglected to analyze the 
plaintiffs' claims in the context of the entire 
class. We affirm the Court of Appeals and 
remand for trial. 
I. FACTS 
As noted above, the underlying action is a 
class-action lawsuit. Consequently, the 
events surrounding each class member's inju-
ry and subsequent dealings with State Farm 
vary to some extent. However, because the 
facts relating to one member of the class of 
plaintiffs, Tina Van Noy, are essentially rep-
resentative of the entire class, we chronicle 
178?her circumstances. 
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On October 14, 1993, Van Noy was injured 
in an automobile accident. Soon thereafter, 
she began a course of treatment that had 
been prescribed to her by her chiropractor. 
At the time of the accident, Van Noy was 
insured by State Farm. Her policy included 
personal injury protection (PIP), which is 
essentially no-fault coverage for medical ex-
penses arising from bodily injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident. The PIP benefits 
that State Farm provided to Van Noy were 
described in the policy as follows: 
What we Pay 
We will pay for bodily injury to an in-
sured caused by accident resulting from 
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle 
as a motor vehicle: 
1. Medical Expenses. These are reason-
able expenses incurred within three years 
of the date of the accident. These ex-
penses are for necessary: 
a. medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, am-
bulance, hospital, professional nursing 
and rehabilitative services[.] 
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 791. The "Settlement 
of Loss" portion of the policy stated that: 
Payments will be made on a monthly basis 
within 30 days after we have proof of the 
amount due. 
CP at 619. The same section further provid-
ed: 
The amount due under this coverage shall 
be decided by agreement. If the insured 
and we cannot agree, it will be decided by 
arbitration upon mutual written consent. 
CP at 619. 
Approximately three weeks after the acci-
dent, Van Noy received a letter from the 
State Farm "First Party Benefits Expedi-
ter." CP at 793. The letter requested that 
Van Noy complete an enclosed application 
for medical benefits and also stated that: 
Your insurance policy provides for pay-
ment of medical expenses that are reason-
able and necessary. To assist us in 
^^determining this, we may obtain a sec-
ond medical opinion. We may also have 
the treatment reviewed by other medical 
professionals. Your policy provides you 
must notify us as soon as reasonably possi-
ble after your treatment begins. 
CP at 794. Van Noy complied with State 
Farm's request and filled out the medical 
benefits application. She then returned it to 
State Farm. This was followed by the sub-
mission to State Farm of billings that Van 
Noy had received from her health care pro-
viders. 
For several months after the application 
and billings were sent to State Farm, Van 
Noy had no contact with the company. Fi-
nally, on March 28, 1994, nearly five months 
after Van Noy first began receiving treat-
ment for her injuries, she received a missive 
from State Farm that stated, in relevant 
part, that: 
Our contract of insurance with you re-
quires that we pay only charges that are 
reasonable, necessary, and accident relat-
ed. For that reason, we will be submitting 
the chiropractic and massage billings to an 
independent chiropractic consultant for 
evaluation. We will be guided by their 
recommendations and will pay only those 
charges which are deemed reasonable and 
necessary. 
CP at 796. 
Approximately one month later, Van Noy's 
attorney received another letter from State 
Farm. This letter indicated that State Farm's 
"peer review" determined that only a portion 
of Van Noy's claims would be paid. CP at 
798. The letter also informed Van Noy's 
attorney that the "peer review group" was in 
the midst of evaluating the other billings 
submitted by Van Noy and that State Farm 
"will advise you of the outcome." CP at 798. 
As a consequence of State Farm's action, 
Van Noy remained personally liable for the 
unpaid portion of the expenses for her treat-
ment. 
II. PROCEEDINGS 
Shortly thereafter, Van Noy and two other 
State Farm policyholders, Patricia Faye Din-
nis and Elaine EbersoleJ^initiated a class-
action lawsuit against State Farm. In their 
complaint they alleged that State Farm: (1) 
breached its fiduciary duty and contractual 
obligations, (2) engaged in bad faith handling 
of claims, and (3) violated the Washington 
Consumer Protection Act. Fundamentally, 
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the plaintiffs complained that State Farm 
ignored the language in its policies that pro-
vided that payments be made on a monthly 
basis and, instead, "stockpiles" the bills for 
months before finally deciding whether to 
honor claims for medical expenses. Answer to 
Pet. for Review at 1. The plaintiffs sought 
damages for all health care provider ex-
penses that State Farm disallowed more than 
30 days after receipt of the PIP claims. All 
of their causes of action were based on what 
they claimed was "State Farm's practice of 
retroactive demal of coverage, effective 
months prior to when the notice [was] given." 
CP at 30. Pursuant to CR 23, the plaintiffs 
moved for class certification. Over State 
Farm's objections, the trial court granted 
their motion and certified a statewide class of 
State Farm policyholders whose policies con-
tained PIP coverage. 
The class moved for partial summary judg-
ment on the issues of State Farm's duty and 
breach of that duty. State Farm responded 
with its own summary judgment motion, as-
serting that all of the claims against it should 
be dismissed. The trial court denied the 
class's motion but granted State Farm's and 
dismissed the lawsuit entirely. 
The class appealed to Division One of the 
Court of Appeals. That court reversed the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of State 
Farm, and remanded for trial, concluding 
that there were issues of material fact with 
respect to each cause of action brought by 
the plaintiffs. See Van Noy v. State Farm 
Mut Auto Ins. Co., 98 WashApp. 487, 983 
P.2d 1129 (1999). We, thereafter, granted 
State Farm's petition for review. 
III. DISCUSSION 
[1] State Farm's petition raises two is-
sues for our consideitation.790 It first con-
tends that the Court of Appeals erroneously 
formulated the applicable fiduciary duty that 
State Farm owes to its first-party insureds. 
State Farm's second claim of error is that 
1. State Farm also asserts in its petition for re-
view that the plaintiffs failed to present "class-
wide evidence" of reliance and breach m their 
tort and CPA claims Pet for Review at 15, 19 
These arguments essentially attack the trial 
court's decision to certify this case as a class 
action lawsuit Because State Farm could have 
the Court of Appeals "erred in its treatment 
of plaintiffs' breach of contract claim." Pet. 
for Review at 14.1 The class responds that 
the appellate court correctly formulated the 
applicable fiduciary duty and did not err in 
concluding that there was a factual question 
as to whether State Farm breached its con-
tract with Van Noy, Dinnis, Ebersole and the 
other members of the class. 
[2,3] Summary judgment orders are re-
viewed de novo by this court Hayden v. 
Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins Co., 141 Wash.2d 55, 
1 P.3d 1167 (2000). In doing so we observe 
the well-known principle that summary judg-
ment is appropriate "if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
CR 56(c). Such a motion will be granted, 
after considering the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, only 
if reasonable persons could reach but one 
conclusion. Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wash.2d 
491, 495, 951 P.2d 761 (1998). 
A. State Farm's Fiduciary Duty 
State Farm asserts that the Court of Ap-
peals erred in two respects in its analysis of 
the fiduciary duty it owed to the plaintiff 
class. There are two components to State 
Farm's argument. First, it claims that the 
appellate court's opinion could be erroneous-
ly interpreted as imposing a duty on insur-
ance companies to " 'disclose all facts that 
would aidj^iits insureds in protecting their 
interests ' " Pet. for Review at 9. It also 
asserts that the Court of Appeals incorrectly 
imposed a "novel duty" on State Farm when 
the court stated that "'[a]n insurer has an 
enhanced fiduciary obligation . ' " Pet. 
for Review at 11. In support of its argu-
ment, State Farm points to the following 
portion from the Court of Appeals opinion: 
raised these certification issues at the Court of 
Appeals, we do not address these issues See 
RAP 5 1(d), RAP 2 4(a) We also decline to 
discuss issues that State Farm has raised m its 
supplemental brief because these issues were not 
previously raised in State Farm's petition for 
review See RAP 13 7(b) 
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A fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relation-
ship exists between an insurer and its in-
sured. An insurer has an enhanced fidu-
ciary obligation that rises to a level higher 
than that of mere honesty and lawfulness 
of purpose. It requires an insurer to deal 
fairly with an insured, giving equal consid-
eration in all matters to the insured's in-
terests as well as its own. 
The representatives argue that State 
Farm owed and violated three overlapping 
fiduciary duties to its insureds: (1) the 
duty to disclose all facts that would aid its 
insureds in protecting their interests; (2) 
the duty of equal consideration; and (3) 
the duty not to mislead its insureds. 
Whether or not breach of any of these 
duties is ultimately supported, at a mini-
mum there is a factual question in this case 
whether State Farm fully, timely, or ade-
quately disclosed the possibility of the ret-
roactive denial of medical claims. 
Van Noy, 98 Wash.App. at 492, 983 P.2d 
1129 (footnotes omitted). 
State Farm takes exception to this excerpt 
from the Court of Appeals decision to the 
extent it appears to impose a duty on State 
Farm to " 'disclose all facts that would aid its 
insureds in protecting their interests ' " 
Pet. for Review at 9. It contends that an 
insurer does not owe such a duty to its 
insured. Such a duty, it argues, exists only 
in legal relationships that are deemed "true 
fiduciary relationships" such as the relation-
ship between a trustee and a beneficiary. 
Id. (citing Allard v. Pac. Nat'l Bank 99 
Wash.2d 394, 663 P.2d 104 (1983)). 
State Farm is correct in observing that the 
phrase "duty to disclose all facts that would 
aid its insureds" has its roots in a decision of 
this court that dealt with a true fiduciary 
relationship, i.e., the relationship between a 
trustee and beneficiary. In Esmieu v. 
Schrag, 88 Wash.2d 490, 498, 563|792P.2d 203 
(1977), we observed that a trustee's fiduciary 
"duty includes the responsibility to inform 
the beneficiaries fully of all facts which 
would aid them in protecting their inter-
ests.'" Id. (emphasis added). After our deci-
sion in Esmieu, we noted in another case 
that the fiduciary duty we discussed in Es-
mieu was that of a "true fiduciary" and 
further observed that "something less than a 
true fiduciary relationship exists" in the in-
surance context. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Butler, 118 Wash.2d 383, 389, 823 P.2d 499 
(1992). Thus, it appears that the phrase 
State Farm assails, which is based on our 
decision in Esmieu, has no application in an 
insurance context. 
We are not troubled, however, by the fact 
that the Court of Appeals made reference to 
the language in Esmieu applicable to a "true 
fiduciary." That is so because the Court of 
Appeals merely made reference to the "duty 
to disclose all facts that would aid its in-
sureds" in setting forth the argument ad-
vanced by the class representatives. It did 
not, in our judgment, indicate that there was 
a factual question about whether this duty 
was breached. Rather, it concluded that 
there was a factual question about "whether 
State Farm fully, timely, or adequately dis-
closed the possibility of the retroactive denial 
of medical claims." In short, the Court of 
Appeals did not hold, nor did it suggest, that 
State Farm was a "true fiduciary." To the 
contrary, the opinion explicitly states that a 
"quasi-fiduciary relationship" exists between 
State Farm and the plaintiff class. Van 
Noy, 98 WasLApp. at 492, 983 P.2d 1129. 
State Farm also contends that the Court of 
Appeals erred by imposing a "novel fiduciary 
duty" on State Farm by stating that " '[a]n 
insurer has an enhanced fiduciary obligation 
. . . ' " Pet. for Review at 11. State Farm 
suggests that an insurance company has an 
" 'enhanced fiduciary obligation'" only when 
it is "defending an insured under a third-
party liability policy, and under a reservation 
of rights." Id. at 11-12. Because in this 
case State Farm is dealing with its insured, it 
argues, it has no "enhanced fiduciary obli-
gation." Id. at 11. 
[4,5] |793The lower court's discussion of 
fiduciary duty cannot, in our view, be read as 
wrongly stating the fiduciary duty that State 
Farm owed to the plaintiff class. As we have 
noted, the Court of Appeals correctly ob-
served that there is a "quasi-fiduciary rela-
tionship that exists between an insurer and 
its insured." Van Noy, 98 Wash.App. at 492, 
983 P.2d 1129. The court was also correct 
Cite as 16 P.3d 
when it followed the reference to an insur-
ance company's "enhanced fiduciary obli-
gation" with the statement that an insurer 
must "deal fairly with an insured, giving 
equal consideration in all matters to the in-
sured's interests as well as its own." Van 
Noy, 98 WashApp. at 492, 983 P.2d 1129. 
The latter statement from the Court of Ap-
peals' opinion regarding the obligations of an 
insurer is unassailable because it is essential-
ly a verbatim statement of the fiduciary duty 
that this court has imposed upon insurance 
companies in both first-party and third-party 
contexts.2 See Coventry Assocs. v. Am. 
States Ins. Co., 136 Wash.2d 269, 280, 961 
P.2d 933 (1998); McGreevy v. Or. Mut Ins 
Co., 128 Wash.2d 26, 36-37, 904 P.2d 731 
(1995) (citing Tank v. State Farm Fire & 
Cos. Co., 105 Wash.2d 381, 385-86, 715 P.2d 
1133 (1986)). It is not at all surprising to us, 
therefore, t h a t ^ t h e Court of Appeals cites 
to both McGreevy and Tank to support its 
discussion of the insurers' fiduciary duty. 
The only arguable problem with the Court 
of Appeals' formulation of the fiduciary duty 
is its use of the word "enhanced" to modify 
the words "fiduciary obligation." See Van 
Noy, 98 WashApp. at 492, 983 P.2d 1129. 
The use of that word is not, however, proble-
matic because it is apparent that the Court of 
Appeals used it to emphasize the fact that an 
insurance company has an elevated good 
faith obligation "that rises to a level higher 
than that of mere honesty and lawfulness of 
purpose." Van Noy, 98 Wash.App. at 492, 
983 P.2d 1129. We are satisfied that the 
2. We note that Justice Talmadge asserts, m his 
concurring opinion, that an insurer does not owe 
a fiduciary duty to its insureds in the first-party 
insurance context, but rather, owes only a duty 
of "good faith " We are doubtful that there is 
any real difference between a "fiduciary" duty 
and a duty of "good faith" m the insurance 
context We say that because we have long held 
that the duty of the insurer to act m good faith 
toward the insured is the same as the fiduciary 
relationship that the insurer has to the insured 
See Tank v State Farm Fire & Cos Co, 105 
Wash 2d 381, 385, 715 P 2d 1133 (1986) ("The 
duty to act m good faith or liability for acting in 
bad faith generally refers to the same obligation 
the fiduciary relationship existing between 
the insurer and insured ") 
Even assuming, however, that there is a differ-
ence between a "fiduciary" duty and a duty of 
"good faith" m the insurance context, we dis-
574 (Wash. 2001) 
reference to "enhanced fiduciary obligation" 
was not made to impose a novel fiduciary 
duty on State Farm. A comparison of this 
court's discussion of an insurance compan}^ 
fiduciary obligation in Tank and the Court of 
Appeals statement in Van Noy leads us to 
this conclusion. In Tank, we noted that: 
an insurance company's duty of good faith 
rises to an even higher level than that of 
honesty and lawfulness of purpose toward 
it policyholders: an insurer must deal fair-
ly with an insured, giving equal consider-
ation in all matters to the insured's inter-
ests. 
Tank, 105 Wash.2d at 386, 715 P.2d 1133. 
As the excerpt from Tank illustrates, an 
insurance company has an elevated or "en-
hanced" duty of good faith which requires it 
to "deal fairly" giving "equal consideration" 
to its insureds. In sum, we believe that it is 
this duty of fair dealing and equal consider-
ation that the Court of Appeals was referring 
to when it made the statement to which State 
Farm takes exception. 
We hold that the Court of Appeals did not 
err in its formulation of the applicable fidu-
ciary duty that an insurer owes to its in-
sured. That duty, as has been described by 
the courts of this state on several occasions, 
is a duty to exercise a high standard of good 
faith which obligates it to deal fairly and give 
"equal consideration" in all matters to the 
insured's interests. The Court of Appeals 
did not stray from that definition and, there-
fore, there was no error in its | resformulation 
agree with the notion that an insurer has only a 
duty of "good faith," and not a "fiduciary" duty, 
to its insureds m the first-party insurance con-
text We note in this regard that we have stated 
"[Tjhe fiduciary relationship existing between in-
surer and insured exists not only as a result 
of the contract between insurer and insured, but 
because of the high stakes involved for both 
parties to an insurance contract and the elevated 
level of trust underlying insureds' dependence on 
their insurers " Tank, 105 Wash 2d at 385, 715 
P 2d 1133 This dependence and heightened lev-
el of trust exists not only where the insurer and 
the insured's interests are aligned, as in the 
third-party context, but also, and perhaps even 
more so, in the first-party context, where the 
insurer's interests might be opposed to the in-
sured's and the insured is particularly vulnerable 
and dependent on the insurer's honesty and good 
faith 
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of the applicable fiduciary duty that State 
Farm owes to the plaintiff class. 
B. Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claim 
[6] State Farm also contends that the 
Court of Appeals neglected to analyze the 
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim in the 
class context. More specifically, it suggests 
that the court erred in distinguishing the 
Court of Appeals case of Reichl v State 
Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Wash.App. 452, 
880 P.2d 558 (1994), in its analysis of plain-
tiffs' contract claims. 
The plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is 
based on the language in the insurance policy 
that states "[pjayments will be made on a 
monthly basis within 30 days after we have 
proof of the amount due." The class con-
tends that this language obligated State 
Farm to pay or deny claims within 30 days of 
receipt of medical bills or, at minimum, pro-
vide "sufficient disclosure of the possibility of 
retroactive denial." Answer to Pet. for Re-
view at 15. State Farm argues that the 
Court of Appeals failed to follow the Reichl 
opinion, suggesting that it is a case where 
the court was "confronted with precisely the 
same policy language" we have here. Pet. 
for Review at 14. According to State Farm, 
the Court of Appeals, Division Two, held in 
Reichl that " 'proof of the amount due'" is 
not equivalent with " 'submission of medical 
bills.'" Id. It argues, therefore, that it was 
not in breach of the insurance contract when 
it failed to pay the claims within 30 days 
after it received medical bills from its in-
sured. 
We find ourselves in agreement with the 
Court of Appeals that Reichl is distinguish-
able from the present case. In that case, the 
plaintiff sought damages from her insurance 
company for delay in payment of her medical 
bills. The Court of Appeals concluded there 
that delay damages were not justified under 
the evidence because the plaintiff had failed 
to timely provide additional proof or informa-
tion sought by the insurer before fully set-
tling her claims 1796against the tortfeasor. In 
other words, because the plaintiff m Reichl 
was partially at fault for any delay in pro-
cessing the claims, damages were not avail-
able to her. 
Here, unlike the situation in Reichl the 
issue of who is responsible for the delay is 
not material to the plaintiffs' breach of con-
tract claim. The plaintiffs claim that State 
Farm breached the contractual agreement 
because it failed to "provide[ ] sufficient dis-
closure of possibility of the retroactive deni-
al." Answer to Pet. for Review at 15. The 
contractual issue, therefore, revolves around 
the reasonableness of State Farm's action in 
handling the claims that were presented to it. 
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, 
that issue should be resolved by a trier of 
fact. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we are satisfied that the 
Court of Appeals properly defined the scope 
of State Farm's fiduciary duty in this case. 
Furthermore, we do not believe that the 
Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the 
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. We, 
therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals deter-
mination that the decision of the trial court 
granting summary judgment to State Farm 
should be reversed. 
SMITH, SANDERS, IRELAND, 
BRIDGE, JJ., and GUY, J.P.T., concur. 
TALMADGE, J.* (concurring). 
While I agree with the majority this case 
should be remanded for trial, I write sepa-
rately because of the majority's imprecise 
formulation of State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Company's (State Farm) duty 
to its insureds. 
As the majority notes, the Court of Ap-
peals spoke in terms of an "enhanced" fidu-
ciary duty owed by State Farm to its in-
sureds- The Court of Appeals' formulation 
of this duty implied the insurer was essen-
tially a true fiduciary toj^its insured. The 
majority correctly disagrees with that formu-
* Justice Philip Talmadge is serving as a justice pro Const art IV, § 2(a) (amend 38) 
tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to 
VAN NOY v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO. Wash. 581 
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lation of the duty owed by insurers to in-
sureds.1 
In the most basic sense, a fiduciary duty 
arises out of a trust relationship: 
A leading authority defines a fiduciary 
as "a person having a duty, created by his 
undertaking, to act primarily for the bene-
fit of another in matters connected with his 
undertaking." The usual expectation, 
based on the nature of the relationship, is 
that a fiduciary will discharge this under-
taking to act on behalf of another in a 
selfless manner and will indeed act "pri-
marily" for the benefit of the other, which 
includes keeping J798the interests of the 
other foremost in mind (through loyalty 
and full disclosure) and acting with care. 
A fiduciary relationship is a relationship 
of trust, which necessarily involves vulner-
ability for the party reposing trust in an-
1. This confusion regarding the duty of an insurer 
to an insured is entirely understandable. As a 
commentator noted: 
The characterization of an insurer's respon-
sibility as "fiduciary" is neither analytically 
precise nor functionally helpful. In fact, the 
courts' use of the term "fiduciary" in insur-
ance cases has been muddled and confusing. 
As early as 1960, the Washington Supreme 
Court characterized an insurer's duty of good 
faith as one that "springs from a fiduciary 
relationship." In Tank v. State Farm Fire & 
Cos. Co., the court continued to characterize 
the insurer-insured relationship as fiduciary in 
nature. However, in Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Butler, the court subsequendy stated that it had 
always been "clear" from the "language" of 
Tank that it was not a "true" fiduciary rela-
tionship. After reconsidering its earlier char-
acterization of the insurer-insured relationship, 
the court in Butler has offered the conceptually 
murky characterization that the relationship 
between an insurer and its insured has "fidu-
ciary aspects," but is "something less" than a 
true fiduciary relationship. 
More recently, the Supreme Court has im-
properly characterized the insurer-insured re-
lationship as one that involves even more than 
a normal fiduciary relationship. In McGreevy 
v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., the court referred to 
the relationship as a "special fiduciary rela-
tionship" and an "enhanced fiduciary obli-
gation." 
Of more practical benefit are the specific 
standards imposed by WAC 284-30-300 et seq. 
and the general analytical tools formulated in 
Tank for the evaluation of whether an insurer 
complied with its good-faith duties. Charac-
terizing the duty is far less important than 
defining, at least in general terms, what that 
other. One's guard is down. One is trust-
ing another to take actions on one's behalf. 
Under such circumstances, to violate a 
trust is to violate grossly the expectations 
of the person reposing the trust. Because 
of this, the law creates a special status for 
fiduciaries, imposing duties of loyalty, care, 
and full disclosure upon them. One can 
call this the fiduciary principle. To recog-
nize such duties and enforce a reasonable 
expectation of trust, requiring a person 
granted the trust of another to honor and 
respect that trust is both understandable 
and of utmost importance. 
J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fidu-
ciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bar-
gain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 
Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 439, 441-42 (1997) (foot-
notes omitted).2 
In our cases, we have held the utmost 
duty, placing the interest of the person to 
duty requires. An insurer must know the ex-
tent to which it can weigh its legitimate inter-
ests against those of its insured. Without such 
guidance, an insurer cannot properly deter-
mine how to resolve the various problems that 
it will face in discharging its obligations. 
In Tank and Butler, the court defined the 
weight that an insurer must give to its insured's 
interests. The standard that an insurer must 
follow is both simple and conceptually clear: 
"[A]n insurer must deal fairly widi an insured, 
giving equal consideration in all matters to the 
insured's interests." An insurer is not obligat-
ed to subjugate its own legitimate interests to 
the interests of its^ insured. 
Thomas V. Harris, Washington Insurance Law 
§ 2.2 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
2. The duty of a fiduciary to his beneficiary is 
essentially that of a trustee. A fiduciary "is 
bound to act m the highest good faith toward his 
beneficiary" and he may never seek to gain an 
advantage over his beneficiary by any means. A 
fiduciary must give priority to his beneficiary's 
best interest whenever he acts on the beneficia-
ry's behalf. A fiduciary owes his beneficiary a 
duty of undivided loyalty, meaning that a fiducia-
ry cannot abandon or stray from this relationship 
to further his own interests. Examples of fidu-
ciary relationships include "an attorney for a 
client, a corporate director or officer for the 
corporation or its shareholders, an agent for the 
principal, a guardian for the ward, a bailee for 
the bailor, a partner for the other partners, joint 
venturers for one another, and a physician for 
his patient." 
Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are 
Not Fiduciaries to Their Insureds, 88 Ky. L.J. 1, 2 
(2000) (footnotes omitted). 
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whom the duty is owed above that of the 
fiduciary's personal interest, is owed only in 
the context of a "true" fiduciary relationship 
like trustee/beneficiary. Esmieu v. Schrag, 
88 Wash.2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977). This 
"true" fiduciary duty does not exist in the 
insurance setting. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Butler, 118 Wash.2d 383, 389, 823 P.2d 499 
(1992). But we have imposed a lesser fiducia-
ry duty where the insurer defends an 
inj5ured799 under a reservation of rights. In 
Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105 
Wash.2d 381, 385-86, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986), 
we described this duty as follows: 
Such a relationship exists not only as a 
result of the contract between the insurer 
and insured, but because of the high stakes 
involved for both parties to an insurance 
contract and the elevated level of trust 
underlying insureds' dependence on their 
insurers. This fiduciary relationship, as 
the basis of an insurer's duty of good faith, 
implies more than the "honesty and lawful-
ness of purpose" which comprises a stan-
dard definition of good faith. It implies "a 
broad obligation of fair dealing", and a 
responsibility to give "equal consideration" 
to the insured's interests. Thus, an insur-
ance company's duty of good faith rises to 
an even higher level than that of honesty 
and lawfulness of purpose toward its poli-
cyholders: an insurer must deal fairly with 
an insured, giving equal consideration in 
. all matters to the insured's interests. 
This duty in the third party context is 
entirely understandable. The insurer is si-
multaneously defending the insured against a 
lawsuit by a third party under the insurance 
policy's duty to defend/duty to indemnify and 
litigating issues of coverage with the insured. 
The potential for an insurer's conflicting loy-
alties and financial interests is manifest and 
our crafting of a fiduciary duty owed by 
insurers to insureds is entirely sensible. 
But the duty owed by an insurer to an 
insured in the first-party insurance setting is 
an entirely different matter and the majori-
ty's formulation of the "fiduciary" duty owed 
by the insurer to the insured in the first-
party insurance context is imprecise. It is 
difficult to understand how an insurer can be 
a fiduciary to its insured when there is a 
conflict regarding a claim. This is not like 
the circumstance in a reservation of rights 
situation described in Tank. As one commen-
tator noted: 
The relationship between a first-party 
insurer and its policyholder is ill-suited for 
fiduciary controls. Indeed, fiduciary theo-
ry simply does not work here for at least 
two reasons. First and foremost, an insur-
er's interests and an insured's interests 
Isooare not aligned when the insured is 
claiming on his own behalf, as they are in 
third-party cases where insurer and in-
sured face a common adversary. The in-
surer is never cast as the insured's agent. 
The insurer and insured do not deal in 
trust when a first-party claim is made; 
here they are adversaries. Even when a 
claim is clearly covered, the insurer and 
insured may disagree over the amount due 
or the nature of the benefits to be paid. 
This inherent conflict, which is well-recog-
nized in insurance law, cannot be recon-
ciled with the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship. 
Second, there is no conceivable set of 
circumstances in which the insured surren-
ders control of litigation in which it is a 
party to the insurer. In the first-party 
context, any litigation is the product of 
either the insured or the insurer suing the 
other. Regardless, the insured controls 
the litigation. 
Richmond, supra, at 20 (footnotes omitted). 
We have discussed the duty owed by first-
party insurers to insureds as one of good 
faith. Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. 
Co., 136 Wash.2d 269, 961 P.2d 933 (1998). 
Good faith is the proper analytical focus for 
first-party insurance because the relationship 
between a first-party insurer and insured 
does not involve a fiduciary duty, enhanced, 
limited, or otherwise. 
The more precise formulation of the duty 
owed by the insurer carrier to the insured is 
that of good faith, rather than a fiduciary 
duty. This duty of good faith permeates 
Washington's Insurance Code. For example, 
RCW 48.01.030 defines the public interest in 
insurance: 
The business of insurance is one affected 
by the public interest, requiring that all 
persons be actuated by good faith, abstain 
u i e a s i& Jf.3d 
from deception, and practice honesty and 
equity in all insurance matters. Upon the 
insurer, the insured, their providers, and 
their representatives rests the duty of pre-
serving inviolate the integrity of insurance. 
See also WAC 284-30 (fair claims handling). 
Under this duty of good faith, in the first-
party insurance setting, the [goiinsurer must 
deal fairly with its insured m the claim con-
text of a claim and must give equal consider-
ation to the interests of the insured in han-
dling a claim. 
While I agree with the majority's disposi-
tion of this case, the stronger analytical an-
chor for the majority's approach to the re-
lationship between first-party insurers and 
insureds in claims handling will be found in 
the duty of good faith expressed in Wash-
ington's Insurance Code rather than the 
more amorphous and inappropriate formula-
tion of a fiduciary relationship. 
JOHNSON, J., and MADSEN, J., concur. 
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DAVIS, J. 
This is an appeal from county court in which the court 
certified the following question as one of great public 
importance: 
IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER MEDICAL BENEFITS IN A LAWSUIT 
UNDER SECTION 627.736, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHERE THE 
ONLY DEFENSE BY AN INSURER IS THAT THE MEDICAL 
TREATMENT WAS NOT RELATED, NOT REASONABLE AND/OR NOT 
NECESSARY, MUST AN INSURER OBTAIN THE REPORT REQUIRED 
UNDER SECTION 627.736(7), FLORIDA STATUTES, 
CONSTITUTING "REASONABLE PROOF" WITHIN THIRTY (30) 
DAYS OF RECEIVING WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE FACT OF A 
COVERED LOSS AND OF THE AMOUNT OF SAME BEFORE IT CAN 
DEFEND ON THE BASIS THAT THE MEDICAL BILLS ARE NOT 
REASONABLE, NOT RELATED AND/OR NOT NECESSARY? 
We answer the question in the negative and certify direct 
conflict with Perez v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 746 
So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), review granted. United 
Automobile Insurance Company v. Rodriguez, 767 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 
2000). 
Appellee, Karen Jones (Jones) , was involved in an automobile 
accident on or about October 19, 1996. At the time of the 
accident, Jones had in full force and effect a policy of 
personal injury protection insurance with Appellant, State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). In December 
1996, Jones began treating with Gerald Chernekoff, a 
chiropractic physician with Bayou Chiropractic. Bayou 
Chiropractic referred Jones to Nu-Best Diagnostics for a motion 
x-ray of the cervical spine on January 13, 1998. State Farm 
received the bill for the cost of the x-ray ($650) on January 
26, 1998. On or about February 5, 1998, State Farm sent the 
motion x-ray records to Joseph Costello, Jr., D.C., for his 
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review and determination of medical necessity. State Farm did 
not receive an opinion from Dr. Costello until March 31, 1998, 
who indicated that the testing was not necessary. It is 
undisputed that the bill from Nu-Best diagnostics was not paid 
within thirty days of its receipt by State Farm, nor was a 
report obtained by State Farm within that thirty-day period. 
Jones filed a complaint against State Farm, alleging that 
State Farm had failed to pay bills submitted by Nu-Best 
diagnostics which were incurred as a result of her automobile 
accident. She filed a motion for summary judgment based in part 
on the ground that State Farm failed to obtain its report within 
thirty days of notice of the loss and therefore, State Farm was 
without any defense as to the claim for payment of the Nu-Best 
diagnostics bill. The trial court entered a stipulated summary 
final judgment in favor of Jones, certifying the question as 
stated above, which this court accepted as one of great public 
importance. 
Section 627.736 (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), provides 
in part: 
BENEFITS; WHEN DUE.- Benefits due from an insurer 
under ss. 627.730-627.7405 shall be primary, . . . . 
(b) Personal injury protection insurance benefits paid 
pursuant to this section shall be overdue if not paid 
within 30 days after the insurer is furnished written 
notice of the fact of a covered loss and of the amount 
of same. . . . However, any payment shall not be 
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deemed overdue when the insurer has reasonable proof 
to establish that the insurer is not responsible for 
the payment, notwithstanding that written notice has 
been furnished to the insurer. 
(c) All overdue payments shall bear simple interest at 
the rate of 10 percent per year. 
Section 627.736(7), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), provides in 
part : 
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF INJURED PERSON; 
REPORTS. 
(a) Whenever the mental or physical condition of an 
injured person covered by personal injury protection 
is material to any claim that has been or may be made 
for past or future personal injury protection 
insurance benefits, such person shall, upon the 
request of an insurer, submit to mental or physical 
examination by a physician or physicians. . . . An 
insurer may not withdraw payment of a treating 
physician without the consent of the injured person 
covered by the personal injury protection, unless the 
insurer first obtains a report by a physician licensed 
under the same chapter as the treating physician whose 
treatment authorization is sought to be withdrawn, 
stating that treatment was not reasonable, related, or 
necessary. 
In response to a substantially similar certified question, 
the Fourth District held: 
We interpret section 627.736(4) to mean that if 
PIP benefits are payable, they are due within thirty 
days after notice. If the insurer has refused to pay 
the bill within thirty days and does not have 
reasonable proof to establish that it is not 
responsible, then the insurer is liable for ten 
percent interest when the bill is paid. Failing to 
obtain proof that it is not responsible for payment, 
however, does not deprive the insurer of its right to 
contest payment. 
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AIU Ins. Co. V. Daidone. 760 So. 2d 1110, 1112-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2000) . The Fourth District reasoned that the thirty-day period 
only applied to benefits which were reasonable and necessary as 
a result of the accident. Id. at 1112. It concluded that if 
benefits were not actually due, they could not be overdue. Id. 
The Fourth District certified conflict with the Third Districts 
opinion in Perez. 
The Fifth District has also held that an insurer's failure 
to pay a claim without reasonable proof that it was not 
responsible for the bill exposes it to the statutory penalties 
of an overdue bill, but does not cause it to lose its right to 
contest the claim. Jones v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 
694 So. 2d 165, 166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). 
In conflict with these holdings, the Third District held in 
Perez that because the insurer did not obtain a report 
constituting reasonable proof that it was not responsible for 
the bills within thirty days of notice of the claim, it was 
responsible for the claim plus the accrued interest, and could 
not defend on the basis that the bills were not reasonable, not 
related and/or not necessary. Perez. 746 So. 2d at 1125-26. 
The Third District based its decision on the opinion of Fortune 
Insurance Company v. Pacheco, 695 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) , 
in which it stated: 
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the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. The 
insurance company has thirty days in which to verify 
the claim after receipt of an application for 
benefits. There is no provision in the statute to 
toll this time limitation. The burden is clearly upon 
the insurer to authenticate the claim within the 
statutory time period. To rule otherwise would render 
the recently enacted "no fault" insurance statute a 
"no-pay" plan - a result we are sure was not intended 
by the legislature. 
Pacheco, 695 So. 2d at 395 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Dunmore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 502, 502 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1974)). The court in Pacheco also held that "once an 
insurer receives notice of a loss and medical expenses, it must 
pay within thirty days, unless pursuant to section 
627.736(4)(b), it has obtained reasonable proof to believe that 
it is not responsible for the payment." Id. However, as noted 
by the Fourth District, both Dunmore and Pacheco are 
distinguishable, in that in both cases it was not disputed that 
benefits were owed. Daidone, 760 So. 2d at 1112. 
Except for section 627.736(8), Florida Statutes (Supp. 
1996), "which provides for attorney!s fees, section 
627.736 (4) (c) , Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), is the only 
penalty specified by the legislature for an insurer failing to 
pay a claim or obtain reasonable proof that it is not 
responsible within thirty days of notice of the claim under 
section 627.736, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). The plain 
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language of section 627.736(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), 
requires only that the insurer pay the claim within thirty days 
or have reasonable proof that the insurer is not responsible for 
payment; if an insurer refuses to pay or obtain reasonable 
proof, it is subject to ten percent interest on the payment and 
attorney's fees. 
Buttressing the decisions of the Fourth and Fifth District, 
is the Second District's opinion in Pioneer Life Insurance v. 
Heidenfeldt. 773 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) . In Heiclenf elflt, 
the court held that section 627.613, Florida Statutes (1997), 
which is substantially similar to section 627.736(4), Florida 
Statutes (Supp. 1996), subjects an insurer to a ten percent 
interest penalty if it does not timely reimburse an insured, but 
does not prohibit the insurer from defending the claim if it 
does not timely reimburse. Heidenfeldt. 773 So. 2d at 77. 
Further, as cited by the court in Heidenfeldt, the Florida 
Supreme Court stated in AIU Insurance Company v. Block Marina 
Investment, Inc., 544 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1989): 
We do not believe that the legislature intended, 
by the enactment of section 627.426(2), to give an 
insured coverage which is expressly excluded from the 
policy or to resurrect coverage under a policy or an 
endorsement which is no longer in effect, simply 
because an insurer fails to comply with the terms of 
the aforementioned statute. . . . 
. . . . This Court recently reiterated the general 
rule that, while the doctrine of estoppel may be used 
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to prevent a forfeiture of insurance coverage, the 
doctrine may not be used to create or extend coverage. 
Block, 544 So. 2d at 999-1000. Both of these decisions support 
the conclusion reached by the Fourth and Fifth Districts that an 
insurer's failure to obtain a written report within thirty days 
of receiving written notice of a loss does not preclude the 
insurer from defending on the basis that the medical bills are 
not reasonable, not related and/or not necessary. 
Accordingly, we align ourselves with the decisions of the 
Fourth and the Fifth District and answer the certified question 
in the negative. Because the issue is currently pending before 
the Florida Supreme Court, we certify conflict with the Third 
District's decision in Perez. We reverse the final summary 
judgment entered in favor of Jones, and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
BARFIELD and LEWIS, JJ., CONCUR. 
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BENTON, J. 
At issue is whether an insured whose medical bills Allstate 
Insurance Company (Allstate) declines to pay can sue Allstate 
for personal injury protection (PIP) and automobile medical 
payments (medpay) benefits, without first paying the medical 
provider, if the medical provider has not yet brought suit 
against the insured. Dino Kaklamanos and Keely Kaklamanos, 
petitioners here, were plaintiffs in county court. Their 
complaint proceeded on the theory that Allstate's failure to pay 
a medical bill they had forwarded (or caused to be forwarded) to 
Allstate breached the PIP and medpay provisions of their motor 
vehicle insurance policy. On appeal from Escambia County Court, 
the Circuit Court, First Circuit, affirmed the final judgment a 
county judge entered in favor of Allstate after granting 
Allstate's motion for summary judgment. We quash the circuit 
court's judgment. 
I. 
The complaint the Kaklamanoses filed in county court on 
April 6, 1999, alleged that a medical provider, Nu-Best 
Diagnostics (NBD), had performed medically reasonable treatment 
or testing on Keely Kaklamanos on January 27, 1999; that an 
automobile accident in which Ms. Kaklamanos had been injured on 
or about February 17, 1998, made the treatment or testing 
necessary; and that NBD's bill had been sent to Allstate, the 
Kaklamanoses' motor vehicle insurer; but that, despite the 
Kaklamanoses' compliance "with all statutory requirements 
precedent to entitlement to benefits," Allstate had 
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refused to pay the bill, even in part. 
Allstate disputed the allegation that the automobile 
accident made the services for which NBD billed reasonably 
medically necessary, but did not dispute other salient facts. 
The parties agreed that an automobile accident had occurred and 
that Allstate's policy was in effect at the time. The 
Kaklamanoses admitted that they had not paid NBD's bill and that 
NBD had not filed suit against them for nonpayment. Allstate 
admitted that it had been duly notified of the circumstances 
allegedly surrounding the injuries "by means of the 'No-Fault' 
application-for-benefits claim form." 
Conceding that NBD's bill remained unpaid only because 
Allstate disputed its reasonable medical necessity in relation 
to the accident, Allstate moved for summary judgment on the 
basis of the following policy provision: 
If an insured person incurs medical 
expenses which [Allstate] deem[s] to be 
unreasonable or unnecessary, [Allstate] may 
•refuse to pay for those medical expenses and 
contest them. 
If the insured person is sued by a medical 
services provider because [Allstate] 
refuse [s] to pay medical expenses which 
[Allstate] deem[s] to be unreasonable or 
unnecessary, [Allstate] will pay resulting 
defense costs and any resulting judgment 
against the insured person. [Allstate] will 
choose the counsel. The insured person must 
cooperate with [Allstate] in the defense of 
any claim or lawsuit. If [Allstate] ask[s] 
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an insured person to attend hearings or 
trials, [Allstate] will pay up to $50.00 per 
day for loss of wages or salary. [Allstate] 
will also pay other reasonable expenses 
incurred at [its] request. 
On grounds that Ms. Kaklamanos had "eschewed the indemnification 
and defense provisions of her policy with" Allstate, the county 
court granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment, ruling 
that there were "no damages to pursue in this action nor can any 
result in the future," and entered summary judgment in favor of 
Allstate accordingly. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed. 
II. 
Initially, we must decide whether the certiorari petition 
the Kaklamanoses have addressed to the circuit court's decision 
falls within the limited "scope of common law certiorari 
jurisdiction." Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 774 So. 2d 679, 682 
(Fla. 2000). Only if "the circuit court's decision constituted 
a denial of procedural due process, application of incorrect 
law, or a miscarriage of justice," Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 683, do 
we properly decide the question their petition presents. 
Certiorari is a common-law writ which 
issues in the sound judicial discretion of 
the court to an inferior court, not to take 
the place of an appeal, but to cause the 
entire record of the inferior court to be 
brought up in order that it may be 
determined from the face thereof whether the 
inferior court has exceeded its 
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jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according 
to the essential requirements of law. 
Confined to its legitimate scope, the writ 
may issue within the court's discretion to 
correct the procedure of courts wherein they 
have not observed those requirements of the 
law which are deemed to be essential to the 
administration of justice. . . , Failure to 
observe the essential requirements of law 
means failure to accord due process of law 
within the contemplation of the 
Constitution, or the commission of an error 
so fundamental in character as to fatally 
infect the judgment and render it void. . . 
It seems to be the settled law of this 
state that the duty of a court to apply to 
admitted facts a correct principle of law is 
such a fundamental and essential element of 
the judicial process that a litigant cannot 
be said to have had the remedy by due course 
of law, guaranteed [by the Florida 
Constitution], if the judge fails or refuses 
to perform that duty. 
State v. Smith, 118 So. 2d 792, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoted with approval in Haines City Cmty. 
Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 527 (Fla. 1995)). Examination of 
the record, including the briefs filed in circuit court, 
persuades us that the circuit court applied1 the incorrect law 
luThe certiorari jurisdiction of district courts of appeal 
may be sought to review . . . final orders of circuit courts 
acting in their review capacity." Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b) (2) . 
The circuit court's per curiam affirmance in the present case is 
such an order. "County court litigants . . . are not precluded 
from seeking review in the district court of appeal when the 
circuit court affirms without opinion, nor are they limited by 
Article V [of the Florida Constitution]." Rich v. Fisher. 655 
So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). 
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in the present case. We reach and decide the merits of the 
petition because the court's purely legal error was 
"sufficiently egregious or fundamental." Haines City Cmty. 
Dev. , 658 So. 2d at 531. See, e.g. , Rader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
26 Fla. L. Weekly D1430, D1431 (Fla. 4th DCA June 6, 2001); 
Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. MTM Diagnostics, Inc., 754 So. 
2d 150, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Glebe Life & Accident Ins, Cc, 
v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 539 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1989) . 
III. 
The policy language on which Allstate relies does not in 
terms purport to place any restrictions on an insured's right to 
sue, if PIP or medpay benefits are not paid in a timely fashion. 
Allstate cannot legally, moreover, diminish2 the extent of its 
PIP and medpay undertakings by adding or amending policy 
provisions. See generally Young v. Progressive Southeastern 
Ins. Co. . 753 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000) (holding uninsured motorist 
policies must conform3 to statutory requirements). Section 
2Amicus curiae argues that the policy language on which 
Allstate relies "is fully consistent with the no-fault law," and 
affords insureds more, not less, protection "by establishing an 
insurer's contractual obligation to pay all costs of defending 
claims and any resulting judgments." 
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"Any insurance policy . . . otherwise valid which contains 
any condition or provision not in compliance with the 
requirements of this code shall . . . be construed and applied 
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627.736(4), Florida Statutes (1997) makes PIP and medpay 
benefits Mue and payable as loss accrues, upon receipt of 
reasonable proof of such loss and the amount of expenses and 
loss incurred which are covered by the policy." 
As the Ivey court recently explained, "the purpose of the 
no-fault statutory scheme is to ^provide swift and virtually 
automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with 
his life without undue financial interruption.' Government 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So.2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1987) (citing Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 790 
(Fla.1978))." Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 683-84. &££ § 
627.736(4) (b), Fla. Stat. (1997) (uPersonal injury protection 
insurance benefits paid pursuant to this section shall be 
overdue if not paid within 3 0 days after the insurer is 
furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and of 
the amount of same."). We have previously held: 
in accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have 
applied had such policy . . . been in full compliance with this 
code." § 627.418(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). See State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swearingen, 590 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1991); see also § 627.412(2), Fla. Stat. (1997) (uNo policy 
shall contain any provision inconsistent with or contradictory 
to any standard or uniform provision used or required to be 
used, but the department may approve any substitute provision 
which is, in its opinion, not less favorable in any particular 
to the insured or beneficiary than the provisions otherwise 
required."); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Suazo. 614 So. 2d 1071 
(Fla. 1992). 
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[T]he statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous. The insurance company has 
thirty days in which to verify the claim 
after receipt of an application for 
benefits. There is no provision in the 
statute to toll this time limitation. The 
burden is clearly upon the insurer to 
authenticate the claim within the statutory 
time period. To rule otherwise would render 
the recently enacted "no-fault" insurance 
statute a "no-pay" plan--a result we are 
sure was not intended by the legislature. 
Dunmore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 502, 502 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1974). See also § 627.736 (4) (f) , Fla. Stat. 
(1997)("Medical payments insurance, if available in a policy of 
motor vehicle insurance, shall pay the portion of any claim for 
personal injury protection medical benefits which is otherwise 
covered but is not payable due to the coinsurance provision of 
paragraph (1) (a) , regardless of whether the full amount of 
personal injury protection coverage has been exhausted."); see 
generally Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Med., 753 
So. 2d 55, 59 (Fla. 2000) (uAn objective of Florida's Motor 
Vehicle No-Fault Law was to provide persons injured in an 
accident with prompt payment of benefits."). 
An insured's claim for PIP or medpay benefits "is a first 
party claim in contract for failure to pay the contractual 
obligation for personal injuries sustained, regardless of 
fault." Levy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 580 So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1991) . Here petitioners adequately alleged that they 
sustained damages as a result of Allstate's failing to pay NBD's 
bill for thirty days.4 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Lee, 678 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1996) (holding that, once thirty 
days elapsed after receipt of the Lees1 PIP claim, "and no 
benefits were paid on the claim, assuming they were properly 
due, [5] State Farm had effectively breached their contract with 
4The complaint alleged generally compliance with all 
statutory conditions precedent. Considering the same question 
presented here, another judge of the Escambia County Court 
reached the opposite conclusion and held, in denying Allstate's 
motion for summary judgment in a different case: 
In addition to the inevitable effects on 
the doctor/patient relationship, Allstate's 
argument that plaintiff will sustain no 
damages as a result of wrongful non-payment 
fails because the indemnification provision 
ignores the harmful consequences to an 
insured's credit history and financial 
future caused by the mere filing of a credit 
driven law suit. Even if Allstate pays any 
judgment obtained by the medical care 
provider, the insured's credit history will 
reflect the untimely payment and subsequent 
judgment. 
Jones v, Allstate InSt GSLL., 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 541, 542 
(Fla. Escambia Cty. Ct. Mar. 26, 2000). The circuit court's per 
curiam affirmance has not resolved the question even within the 
First Circuit. See Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Dist. Court of 
Appeal, 434 So. 2d 310, 311 (Fla. 1983). 
5We have recently held that the lapse of thirty days does 
not cut off an insurer's right to defend on grounds that medical 
bills are unreasonable or unnecessary. See State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones, No. 1D00-3009 (Fla. 1st DCA July 13, 
2001) . See also Gurney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 5D00-
3775 (Fla. 5th DCA July 6, 2001); AIU Ins. Co. v. Daidone. 760 
So. 2d 1110, 1112-13 (Fla. 4th DCA), review pending, SCOO-1547 
(Fla. July 24, 2000); Jones Y, State Farm Mutt Auto, Ins, Co,, 
694 So. 2d 165, 166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) . But see Perez v. State 
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[the Lees]."). 
While upayment shall not be deemed overdue when the insurer 
has reasonable proof to establish that the insurer is not 
responsible for the payment," § 627.736 (4) (b) , Fla. Stat. 
(1997), we agree with the Third District "that the legislature 
provided no [other] exceptions to the thirty-day period, and 
that courts will not countenance insurers' attempts to create 
their own means of tolling that period." Fortune Ins. Co. v. 
Pacheco. 695 So. 2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). 
IV. 
The present case should be distinguished from Rader v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. . 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1430 (Fla. 4th DCA June 6, 
2001), where the Fourth District recently held that the absence 
of any unpaid medical bills defeated the insured's standing to 
allege an anticipatory breach.6 The majority opinion quoted the 
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 746 So. 2d 1123, 1125-26 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1999) , review granted sub nom. United Auto Ins. Co. v. 
Rodriguez, 767 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2000) . 
6Also distinguishable from the present case are two out-of-
state decisions on which Allstate relies: Ny v. Metro. Prop. & 
Cas. Ins. Co. , 1998 Mass. App. Div. 179 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1998), 
1998 WL 603138 (upholding summary judgment against insureds 
where insurance company had paid bills in part and obtained 
releases from the providers for the balances) and McGill v. 
Auto. Ass'n, 526 N.W.2d 12, 13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) 
(affirming summary disposition where insurers had upaid to 
plaintiffs' health care providers amounts that they considered 
reasonable" and the insurance commissioner had directed no-fault 
insurers to provide claimants with "complete protection from 
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circuit court's decision, which explained: 
The Court below did not err in dismissing 
the Amended Complaint, which alleged an 
anticipatory breach of contract. Although 
the insurer's letter stating that it would 
not pay for further medical treatment may be 
an anticipatory breach of contract, such 
breach only relieves the Plaintiff from the 
condition precedent of submitting her claims 
to the Appellee 30 days prior to filing 
suit. Peachtree Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walden, 
759 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). 
The alleged anticipatory breach did not 
relieve the Plaintiff of the necessity of 
incurring and alleging damages in order to 
state a cause of action for breach of 
contract. Miller v. Nifakos, 655 So. 2d 192 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Plowden & Roberts, Inc. 
v. Conway, 192 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1966) . The Plaintiff failed to allege that 
she sustained any damages as a result of the 
Defendant's alleged breach. Further, a 
plaintiff cannot obtain a judgment for 
insurance benefits which have not as yet 
accrued. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 345 
So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) ; Cruz v. 
Union Gen. Ins., 586 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1991); Monsanto Co. v. Fuqua, 280 So. 2d 496 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Walden. Since the 
Plaintiff did not incur any medical expenses 
which the 
Defendant did not reimburse, and any damages 
the Plaintiff might have sustained as a 
result of the alleged anticipatory breach 
are too speculative to sustain an action for 
breach of contract, this Court declines the 
opportunity to affirm the dismissal but 
remand with instructions to allow the 
Plaintiff to amend her complaint. Augusting 
economic loss" including any exposure to "harassment, dunning, 
disparagement of credit, or lawsuit as a result of a dispute 
between the health care provider and the insurer"). 
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v, Southern Pell Tel, & Tel, Co,, 9i so. 2d 
320 (Fla. 1956) distinguishing Byers v. 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 So. 2d 875 
(Fla. 1954)(dismissal appropriate where on 
the face of the complaint damages are too 
speculative to be recoverable). 
The Court understands the Appellant's 
frustration at the inability to obtain 
relief for the 'insurer's alleged 
anticipatory breach. However, if she had 
incurred reasonable, necessary, and related 
medical expenses after the insurer's letter, 
she would have had a cause of action against 
the Appellee for those claims without 
submitting them to the insurer and waiting 
3 0 days. 
Rader, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D1431. Judge Gunther's dissenting 
opinion argued that the insured had standing to assert an 
anticipatory breach even in the absence of unpaid medical bills. 
See id. at D1432 (Gunther, J., dissenting). Nothing in either 
Rader opinion offers any support for the view that an insured 
cannot sue for PIP or medpay benefits thirty days after properly 
presenting a medical bill that the insurer refuses to pay. 
V. 
An insured who incurs reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses on account of an automobile accident sustains losses 
and incurs liability for PIP and medpay purposes, whether or not 
the medical bills have been paid. An insured, who is under no 
legal obligation to assign benefits to providers, may not, 
indeed, be able to pay such bills without first receiving PIP or 
medpay benefits. The recipient of such bills is entitled to sue 
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a defaulting insurer for PIP and medpay benefits. An insured 
may be damaged by an insurance company's failure to pay a claim 
even if the insured has not already paid or been sued by the 
medical provider. 
Allstate's argument in the present case blurs important 
distinctions between contracts of indemnity requiring 
reimbursement of moneys actually paid and liability insurance 
contracts like the Allstate policy at issue here: 
The distinction between contracts of 
indemnity against liability and contracts of 
indemnity against loss has caused a good 
deal of confusion. The former may be 
defined as an undertaking of the indemnitor 
to stand in the place of the indemnitee in 
the performance of some act, as in the 
payment of a debt due to a third person. 
The right of action springs into existence 
with the accrual of liability and the 
failure to discharge it. The contract of 
indemnity against loss is an undertaking to 
repay or reimburse the indemnitee or to make 
good the actual loss which he may suffer. 
The indemnitee, therefore, cannot recover on 
the covenant until he has paid or otherwise 
satisfied the obligation. 
Gaines v. MacArthur, 254 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) 
(quoting Case Comment, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 193 (1936)). A right 
of action arises thirty days after notice to Allstate that 
reasonable and necessary medical treatment against which it has 
insured has resulted in a debt. 
VI. 
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We quash the circuit court's decision because it applies a 
fundamentally incorrect rule of law.7 The Florida Motor Vehicle 
No-Fault Law makes Allstate an ''indemnitor against liability'' 
for reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by 
persons the PIP or medpay provisions cover, uAn expense is the 
same as a debt, and it has been incurred when liability for 
payment attaches." Reliance Mutt Life Inst CQ» VT Booher, 166 
So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). 
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, 
and quash the decision under review, with directions that the 
circuit court reverse the county court's summary judgment and 
remand to county court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
BOOTH and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR. 
7But, because we do not construe Allstate's policy as 
impeding access to the courts, or as otherwise inconsistent with 
the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, we need not, and 
therefore do not, reach the Kaklamanoses' contention that the 
policy fails to conform to the requirements of sections 627.730-
.7405, Florida Statutes (1997), or of article I, section 21 of 
the Florida Constitution. See generally Nationwide Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Med., 753 So. 2d 55, 59 (Fla. 2000) 
(holding that section 627.736(5), Florida Statutes (1995), 
"denies medical providers access to courts" and "arbitrarily 
distinguishes between medical providers and insureds"). 
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Exhibit E 
38 The last word 
The futility of trying to beat the odds 
Whether you're a chronic speeder or a bank robber, your luck always runs out eventually. 
Author George Shaffner takes a look at the statistics of engaging in risky behavior. 
Speeders and bank robbers share an inevitable fate: They get caught. 
For most popular offenses, the odds are 
against getting caught. That's why they're 
popular. But offenders still manage to get 
caught with remarkable consistency. 
Billy Ray DeNiall, a second-year entre-
preneur at the local high school, believes 
he is an undiscovered Formula One racing 
talent who needs to exercise his aptitude 
on a regular basis. So he drives his Dodge 
pickup truck at a steady 15 miles per 
hour over the speed limit to and from 
school every day. 
The local police, who are understaffed, 
can allocate only one car to patrol the 
roads leading to and from the high 
school. Since it is a large high school, 
there are so many roads, and there is so 
little time, the police can apprehend an 
average of only one in every hundred high 
school speeders on any given patrol. 
Billy Ray is a keen observer of local 
law enforcement in action. He knows that 
he has only a 1 percent chance of getting 
caught on any given trip and just a 1-in-
50 chance of getting caught in any given 
day. So he speeds with confidence and 
consistency. 
But the school year is 180 days in 
length. Unless Billy Ray mends his ways, 
he will be ticketed an average of 3.6 times 
per school year, a total of 10 or 11 tickets 
in his three years to graduation. The fines 
will be substantial, Billy Ray's already 
stratospheric insurance rates will escape 
Earth's gravitational influence, and his 
license may be revoked. 
The same principle holds for more seri-
ous forms of illegal activity. Although the 
odds may be against getting caught any 
one time, the chances accumulate with 
repetition. Also, since law enforcement 
officials are sensitive to taxpayer opinion, 
the odds of getting caught tend to 
increase with the severity of the offense. 
If, for example, the chances of robbing 
a bank without getting caught are 75 per-
cent, then one would expect three out of 
four bank robbers to be on the loose. But 
thieves never rob just one bank, because a 
single crime hardly adds up to a produc-
tive career. Besides, the odds are always 
against getting caught the next time. 
Let's suppose that a career in bank 
theft requires about one robbery every 
four months or so. Then, even at a 75 
percent probability of success per theft, 
the chances of avoiding apprehension are 
less then 32 percent by the fourth heist 
(.75 x .75 x .75 x .75). Thus, more than 
two bank robbers in three will celebrate 
their first anniversary on the job in jail. 
After two years, just one in 10 bank rob-
bers will still be plying the trade, which is 
why there are more felons in jail than 
there are on the street. 
According to local law-enforcement 
officials, in fact, 90 percent of all bank 
robbers in the Puget Sound area are appre-
hended. One ought to seriously question 
the sanity of any career that offers a 90 
percent attrition rate after only a few pay-
days, much less one that results in a 
multi-year engagement at a local peniten-
tiary shortly after apprehension. 
The odds of getting caught also hold 
for legal but potentially lethal activities. 
If the chances of having unprotected sex 
without contracting a social disease are 
90 percent per encounter, then the odds 
of making it an extracurricular hobby, say 
one new rendezvous per month through 
two consecutive years of junior college, 
are less than 8 percent. That means that 
the odds of at least one disease transmis-
sion, the consequences of which may be 
fatal, are more than 92 percent. Using the 
same 90 percent probability of avoidance 
per monthly conquest, the odds of con-
tracting one or more sexually transmitted 
diseases will exceed 99 percent prior to 
the completion of a four-year bachelor's 
degree. 
An informed sense of statistical mor-
tality can also be useful in career plan-
ning. If, for instance, your chances of 
successfully squeezing an extra $200 out 
of your monthly expense report are 98 
percent, then you might expect to 
increase your income by $2,400 per year 
with impunity. However, by the 35th 
month, your odds of getting caught will 
exceed 50 percent. In that period, you 
will have "made" an extra $7,000. But 
the consequences of getting caught are 
likely to include immediate termination. 
If your salary is $48,000 per year, and if 
it takes you six months to find an equiva-
lent job, then your net loss, excluding 
humiliation, will be $17,000 ($24,000 in 
salary less $7,000 in improperly claimed 
expenses), which is 85 times $200 per 
month. 
Arithmetic is a hard master. It will 
punish anyone who believes that a pattern 
of mistakes or unnecessary risks is a 
series of isolated, one-time occurrences. 
America's graveyards are full of dead peo-
ple who thought they could make a career 
out of repetitive stupidity. America's jails 
are full of living people, currently 1.5 mil-
lion of them, who thought they could 
make a career out of crime. America's 
streets are full of unemployed people who 
thought they could make a career out of 
not working. 
With repetition, the odds of getting 
caught always move rapidly toward cer-
tainty. It is the Law; there are no excep-
tions. Including you. 
Adapted from The Arithmetic of Life and 
Dearh by George Shaffner. ©1999 by 
George Shaffner. Reprinted with permis-
sion from Ba I Ian tine Books. 
THE WEEK August 10, 2001 
